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Abstract:  
During his tenure in office, Ronald Reagan mounted a punitive war against drug use in 
the United States. This crusade included the vast sentencing discrepancy between powder 
and crack cocaine, which is the focus of this study. Despite their identical chemical 
makeup, it took 500 grams of powder cocaine to warrant a minimum five-year sentence 
and only five grams of crack cocaine to trigger the same sentence. Misconceived notions 
that crack cocaine was instantly additive, incited violence among its users, and preyed 
disproportionally on the young and poor drove politicians to set mandatory minimums for 
crack cocaine 100 times harsher than powder cocaine. Lawmakers assumed drug 
criminals contained an innate deviance or criminality, which drove them to their drug 
use, justifying these harsh penalties and the lack of empathy extended to these so-called 
criminals. However, an examination of psychological studies on drug use and abuse 
reveal that emotional deregulation and trauma are common predictors of drug abuse. 
Interviews with incarcerated women underscore these findings, as many of these 
women—convicted of non-violent drug crimes—identify their use of drugs as a coping 
mechanism rather than an exercise in social deviance. Using psychological and 
sociological studies in conjuncture with testimonies of incarcerated women, this study 
seeks to combat these notions held by lawmakers to demonstrate the inherent flaws of 
Reagan’s drug war. Similarly, this study looks to rap lyrics of the 1980 and1990s as a 
cultural lens into the communities most negatively affected by the drug war. In tracing 
the cultural history of these communities, the necessity of this study is revealed as it 
exposes the human casualties of the drug war. The choice to highlight crack cocaine 
sentencing rather than examine the war on drugs writ large is done to examine the 
deliberations and choices of lawmakers in their policy decisions and attempt to locate 
culpability for the mass incarceration crisis. Doing so reveals that biased police practices 
more so than the laws the enforce are responsible for the disproportionate number of 
incarcerate Black Americans; law enforcement officials, however, cannot be held fully 
responsible as President Reagan, Clinton, and Congress all worked dutifully to ensure 
that individuals convicted of drug crimes remained in prison for years on end rather than 
enter into treatment programs.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Kemba Smith was arrested on charges of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and 
sentenced to serve twenty-four years in a federal prison with no chance of parole. At the 
time of her incarceration shewas pregnant with a baby boy whom she gave birth to while 
in federal custody. When the nurse placed the new born in Smith’s arms, she immediately 
fell in love. As she gazed at her son, trying to memorize every inch of him and enjoy the 
bliss of the moment, a federal marshal interrupted the joy. Smith recalls,  
As my mind flipped through a series of carefully selected memories, a 
knock at the door interrupted everyone’s moment of joy. A tall, stern 
federal marshal marched into the hospital room and ruined everything. He 
seemed furious that my family was in the room with me, and immediately 
began to tell the county officers what they need to do in order to maintain 
the highest level of security as far as I was concerned.  
“What are all of these people doing in here?” he demanded. “She is a 
federal prisoner and is going away for a long time. There are to be no 
visitors in here! No phone calls, no flowers, no family, no visitors 
whatsoever!” 
He lifted the flowers my dad bought me and threw them into the trash. He 
then continued to look around the room, and suck his teeth in disgust. 
“Her hands and her legs need to be shackled at all times,” he instructed.1 
  
                                                           
1 Kemba Smith, Poster Child: The Kemba Smith Story, (Indianapolis: IBJ Book Publishing), 2011, 16 
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Smith was not a crack dealer, nor was she a crack user. In fact, her arrest was not truly 
about her involvement in the illegal drug market but about apprehending her boyfriend, 
Peter Hall. Indeed, upon her arrest Smith was not questioned on her own activities but 
solely about Hall and his acquaintances. However, Hall had prepped Smith for just this 
occasion. Throughout their abusive relationship, Hall constantly reminded Smith not to 
say anything to the authorities about himself or his friends, insisting that Smith had done 
nothing wrong and would not be incarcerated. Tragically, the federal prosecutors had a 
different view point than Hall. Smith’s story is emblematic of so many caught in the 
snares of the drug war. Like many women incarcerated for drug crimes, they were mere 
pawns in a larger chase for high profile drug criminals. Despite their nonviolent crime, 
however, they were treated with the same degradation and lack of empathy as violent 
criminals.     
Today, one in three African American males will go to prison in his lifetime. The 
statistics for Black women are hardly any better; one in sixteen will be incarcerated in her 
lifetime.2 Alone, these numbers are troubling, but are made even more upsetting when 
one realizes that African Americans are ten times more likely to go to prison than White 
Americans.3 This problematic reality has inspired scholars to investigate the origins of 
this racial discrepancy. To fully understand the modern phenomenon of mass 
incarceration, it is necessary to understand the United States’ fraught legacies of race and 
racism. Put another way, in investigating the origins of mass incarceration, one cannot 
                                                           
2 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Key Statistic: Incarceration Rates,” www.bjs.gov 
3 Ibid. 
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separate the disproportionate incarceration of Black Americans from America’s history of 
slavery, racism, and oppression.4 
The oppressive Jim Crow laws that sought to limit the advancement of people of 
color remained the law of the land until the 1960s. The 1960s and 1970s saw a swell in 
minority groups demanding equal treatment in the United States and a public fight 
against Jim Crow. While African American oppression often gets the most publicity, it is 
important to note that the United States extended oppression amongst all people of color. 
Indeed, Latino, Native, Asian, and African American groups increased their activism 
throughout these decades and gained much needed public attention. The common thread 
of these groups was a desire to dismantle or upset the White power structure in the United 
States and bring an end to the many injustices these groups had been subjected to. These 
various movements represented a major problem for the existing system of power and 
frightened many White citizens, who benefitted from the system of white supremacy 
throughout United States history. 
This anxiety created a desire among middle class White Americans to return to 
traditional family values. Sensing this want, Richard Nixon chose to capitalize on the 
chaotic atmosphere and famously called for a return to law and order during his 1968 
Presidential campaign. Included in this law and order was an all out war on drugs.5 
During his five-year tenure as president, Nixon only passed a handful of laws—
enhancing penalties for drug crimes, which suggests that Nixon’s war on drugs was never 
                                                           
4Khalil Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 2011, 14. 
5 Nixonland 
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truly about reducing drug use at all. Indeed, an aide to the Nixon Administration recently 
came forth and revealed that the war on drugs was actually nothing more than an attempt 
to incarcerate vocal left wing opposition, including young people who identified with the 
counter culture, stating, “Nixon…had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people… 
We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting 
people to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then 
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could… vilify them 
night after night on the evening news.”6 Consequently, historical discussions on the war 
on drugs must differentiate Nixon’s drug war from his successors. The Nixon drug war 
had blatantly discriminatory intentions, while his predecessors did not. Moreover, while 
Nixon first called for a war against drug abuse, it was Ronald Reagan who truly mounted 
an all out war on drug use in the United States.  
The historiography on the war on drugs and mass incarceration is a new but 
quickly growing field. Historians, such as Elizabeth Hinton and Julie Kohler-Hausman, 
look to the policies of Lyndon Johnson as preparing the way for the war on drugs. They 
maintain that his militarization of urban police forces, which coincided with his war on 
poverty, enabled that massive amounts of arrests that led to the growth of the United 
States’ prison population.7 Michael Fortner examines the preceding decade and the 
Rockefeller drug laws in the state of New York. Fortner identifies the bi-partisan efforts 
                                                           
6 Hilary Hanson, “Nixon Aide Admitted Drug War Was Mean To Target Black People,” Huffington Post, 
March 22, 2016. 
7 Elizabeth, Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in 
America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 2016.; Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “‘The Attila The Hun 
Law’: New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Making of a Punitive State,” Journal Of Social History (Fall 
2010): 71-95. 
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made in the drug war and most notably, several Black public figures that fought for harsh 
penalties.8 Many scholars deride Fortner’s work by accusing him of blaming Black 
Americans for creating the mass incarceration crisis themselves. Donna Murch is one of 
those vocal critics. In her own work examines the racial consequences of crack cocaine 
sentencing structures and the militarization of the Los Angeles Police Department.9  
Building on this scholarship concerning the drug war’s relationship to the modern 
mass incarceration crisis, this work examines the racial, social, political, and economic 
consequences of crack cocaine sentencing structures during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Focusing on the establishment of these severe penalties at the federal level, this study 
begins with Ronald Reagan’s escalation of the war on drugs early in his presidency. It 
outlines the processes by which the Reagan Administration cultivated a mindset in the 
United States that praised tough punishments for drug criminals, the passage of 100/1 
crack cocaine ratio, and the Sentencing Commission’s attempts to remedy the unduly 
harsh discrepancies in federal cocaine sentencing. While tracing the establishment of the 
100/1 sentencing disparity, it is clear that the implementation of the unduly harsh 
penalties for crack cocaine were based not on factual data but on racist anecdotal 
evidence. Misconceived notions that crack cocaine was instantly addictive, incited 
violence among its users, and preyed disproportionally on the young and poor drove 
politicians to set mandatory minimums for crack cocaine 100 times harsher than its 
chemically identical drug, powder cocaine. For example, one Washington Post writer 
                                                           
8 Michael Fortner, The Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 2015. 
9 Donna Murch, “Crack in Los Angeles: Crisis, Militarization, and Black Response in the Late Twentieth-
Century War on Drugs,” Journal of American History (June 2015): 162- 173. 
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claimed “The effect of crack is so instantaneous and devastating that a kid can buy his 
first sample in the morning and be an addict by the afternoon.”10 However, before the 
implementation of the 100/1 sentencing disparity, the Reagan Administration first 
mounted a massive media campaign to earn public support for their drug war. 
Unfortunately, this drug war was based on a series of misconceptions about drug abuse 
and did not truly address the problems that drove individuals to drugs. Instead, it sought 
to criminalize these individuals. 
Focusing on the implementation of sentencing structures for just two drugs rather 
than the war on drugs as a whole allows for the pointed understanding of politicians’ 
decisions regarding drug policy. In studying emails, memos, and other correspondences, 
one can identify the justifications made for what quantities trigger a mandatory minimum 
sentence. This micro approach also enables a study of the discussion concerning 
mandatory minimums. Such an investigation reveals the different quantities suggested for 
mandatory minimums, the reasoning behind those choices, and disagreements among 
politicians on the best course of action. A focused analysis of these discussions exposes 
the attention to detail of politicians concerning drug laws—or lack thereof—, which in 
turn unveils the priorities of lawmakers concerning drug abuse. This understanding of the 
primary concerns of elected officials helps to identify their goals in passing harsh drug 
legislation. Understanding the goals of politicians influence the understanding of their 
policies and the effects of their policies. It is through this complicated cause and effect 
chain that one can assign culpability for the devastating effects of the war on drugs. A 
dual study at the oppressed communities of this time underscores these observations, as 
                                                           
10 Bruce Baskett, “Worse Than Heroin” Washington Post, May 28, 1986. 
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many rap and hip hop artists sought to expose the priorities of politicians and law 
enforcement officials alike. However, cultural biases led many to turn a deaf ear to these 
musicians and allowed for a continuation of the oppressive nature of the war on drugs.  
This study argues that while Nixon's war on drugs was explicitly designed to be 
oppressive toward racial minorities and left wing opposition, President Reagan and First 
Lady Nancy Reagan seem to have truly been trying to eradicate drug use, while 
simultaneously seeking an avenue to earn political points with the public. However, these 
efforts cannot be separated from the nation’s history of racial oppression, and that legacy 
of racialized systems of subordination colored the negative effects of Reagan’s drug 
policies. The influence of this historic racism is most clearly revealed through the 
implementation of the harsh penalties for crack cocaine and the lack of research done 
before setting mandatory minimum sentences for the drug. The misplaced fear and 
anxiety generated by the emergence of crack cocaine was not based on empirical 
evidence but anecdotal evidence that preyed on racialized fears within the American 
public.11 This historical racism was revealed again in White mainstream America’s 
response to the rising popularity of rap and hip hop music during the 1980s and 1990s 
that protested the effects of the drug war on racial minorities. Seeking to draw attention to 
problems in their communities concerning drug use and violence, these artists wrote 
lyrics that attempted to expose the racism still present in the United States in the way of 
police practices and the war on drugs. However, politicians and civilians alike refused to 
                                                           
11 Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, United State Sentencing 
Commission, February 1995, bound, box 8, Deanne Benos, Domestic Policy Council, White House Staff and 
Office Files, v; Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, United State Sentencing 
Commission, 1997, folder: Drugs: Crack Cocaine Sentencing [2], Leanne Shimabukuro, Domestic Policy 
Council, 6. 
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grant credibility to these musicians and accept their complaints as fact, highlighting the 
fact that their motivations in passing harsh drug laws were not entirely pure. 
This study makes two important historiographical contributions to scholarship on 
the war on drugs and mass incarceration. First is the inclusion of rap and hip hop lyrics as 
a window into the African American community’s response to the war on drugs. Using 
these lyrics allows for an understanding of the war on drugs and mass incarceration from 
the perspective of the oppressed. It also locates agency on the part of a people too often 
cast simply as victims of white supremacy. Given the lack of Black voices found in the 
Presidential archives, this inclusion of lyrical matter is necessary to bring the Black 
narrative into this story. This cultural history also serves as an example of contemporary 
voices that combatted the notions held by many politicians, in that the war on drugs was 
failing in its goals to eradicate drug use and instead victimizing large amounts of people 
of color. It also demonstrates that many failed to take these artists’ complaints seriously 
and act to combat the problems these communities faced, indicating a lack of concern for 
the trials of poor communities of color. Second is an explanation of how Congress 
established the 100/1 sentencing discrepancy between powder and crack cocaine. The 
explanation of the establishment of the 100/1 disparity fills an important gap in the 
historiography by examining the choices and motivations of politicians in their quest to 
harshen drug laws in the United States. The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 set 
the mandatory minimum sentencing for anyone carrying just five grams of crack cocaine 
or five hundred grams of powder cocaine at five years in prison despite the identical 
chemical make-up of the two drugs. The stark difference in drug quantity needed to 
trigger the same prison sentence was made more ominous by the fact that Black 
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Americans were convicted of crack charges far more often than White Americans despite 
the fact that they consumed the drug in higher numbers.12     
Just as emerging rap and hip hop artists reveal truths about the plight of African 
American men during the rise of the carceral state, it is important to also examine the 
experiences of African American women. While similar in many ways, there was a 
qualitative difference in the experiences of Black men and women during this time. For 
all the oppression that African American males faced, Black women battled that same 
racism and hate as well as deep misogyny and sexism. Indeed, gender subordination 
exacerbated the overwhelming challenges that African American women faced. Speaking 
of the plight of Black women, Malcolm X stated, “The most disrespected woman in 
America, is the black woman. The most unprotected person in America is the black 
woman. The most neglected person in America is the black woman.”13 Accordingly, this 
study includes perspectives from both Black men and women so that there is a fully 
rounded narrative of those not only caught in the snares of the drug war, but also those 
who triumphed over it. To understand the experiences of African American women, this 
study will turn to interviews with incarcerated women.  
Bringing together the decisions of federal policy makers with the experiences of 
African American men and women attempts to produce a comprehensive examination of 
a particular set of policy initiatives and their effects on individuals of the era. This 
compilation highlights the ways in which the drug war failed in its aims of bringing drug 
                                                           
12 United States Department of Health and Human Services, National Institure on Drug Abuse,  National 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse:1988 Population Estimates, Rockville, MD, 1989. 
13 Malcom X, “Who Taught You to Hate Yourself?” in Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and 
Statements (New York City: Grove Press) 1994, 56. 
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abuse to an end and instead victimized vast amounts of people of color. Reflecting on her 
experiences in the prison system Kemba Smith writes, “More and more, I was starting to 
see how the lives of inmates—institutionalized slaves—are devalued…. Again, I was 
forced to ask, is this what the federal government calls correctional?”14 Smith’s 
observation encapsulates the central problem scholars are confronting in the study of the 
carceral state. Why have policies that were established in the hopes of making the nation 
safer had such negative effects on poor people of color, and why are the accusations 
made against the criminal justice system so often dismissed.
                                                           
14 Smith, Poster Child: The Kemba Smith Story 248. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
AM I VICTIM OF THE THINGS I DID TO MAINTAIN? 
The growth of the middle class following World War II and the subsequent migration of 
White Americans from the inner city to the suburbs created a sobering reality for the 
inner city, now largely inhabited by minorities. This flight was much more than just the 
relocation of people; it also resulted in a grand loss in economic opportunity for 
individuals still living in city centers. Indeed, after this migration many manufacturers 
and factories decided it was in their best economic interest to follow the wealth and 
prosperity out of the inner city and into the suburbs. As Sam Staley notes, “many sectors 
[chose] to move out of the central city altogether.”15 These low skill jobs that provided a 
majority of the employment base for the poor urban community began to be replaced by 
service industry jobs—which offered little in the way of economic advancement—and 
information processing jobs—which required more education and specified skills than 
manufacturing jobs. So while there were jobs in the inner cities, they were not prime 
opportunities for the urban poor, who either lacked the skills for the job or hoped for 
greater economic opportunity that was simply not available in these options. 16
                                                           
15 Sam Staley, Drug Policy and the Decline of American Cities, London: Transaction Publishers, 1992, 14. 
16 Ibid. Clarence Lusane, and Dennis Desmond, Pipe Dream Blues: Racism and the War On Drugs, Boston, 
MA: South End Press, 1991; Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United 
States, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985;  
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This economic decay of the inner city was inextricably linked to the rise of the informal 
economy within city centers. Staley defines informal economic activity as, “transactions and 
exchanges that take place outside of the legal system or legal institutions.”17 This informal 
economy was not only limited to drug dealing, it also manifested in a cash for services system. 
These informal business operated similarly to the larger licit economy, except they were not 
registered with the government and subsequently did not follow the government’s guidelines. 
The rise of this informal economy can be best understood as an effort on behalf of these 
economically depressed communities to cope with their limited economic opportunity.18. 
Members of these populations, due to this economic stratification, were often socially isolated 
from the mainstream society and, by extension, white middle-class mainstream social values. 
Due to this social isolation and dependence on the informal economy, the inner city turned away 
from the rule of law, which Staley characterizes as “the arbitrary will of men acting irrespective 
of the bounds of important social, political, and economic institutions. This activity consists of 
any action directed primarily by the will and interests of individuals or well-organized interest 
groups.”19 The rejection of the rule of law gave way to the acceptance of the rule of man, which 
is determined “through force rather than through the social evolution of complex orders.”20     
 The economic decline of the inner cities was a central component to the rise of the drug 
economy in the inner cities and provided policy makers the justifications needed to mount their 
drug war. Scholars maintain that drug dealing is most often a choice made out of economic 
                                                           
17 Staley, Drug Policy and the Decline of American Cities, 18 
18 Ibid, 20. 
19 Ibid, 56. 
20 Ibid. 
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necessity.21 Indeed, one study found that McDonalds paid its inner city employees an average of 
one dollar less than its suburban counterparts.22 This reveals that many of the economic 
opportunities within the legal economy in the inner city offer little to no upward mobility. 
Subsequently, these individuals turn to the drug market as a way to support themselves. This can 
be best understood as an effort made by these individuals to escape the cycles of poverty they 
were born into. Indeed, one study found that more than two-thirds of drug dealers do not use 
drugs themselves; that same study also found that the illegal narcotics industry was the one of the 
largest employers of Black youth—if not the largest.23 While these individuals are attempting to 
move through the social classes and out of poverty, their actions have an increasingly negative 
impact on their communities. The clearest example being the violence within these 
neighborhoods. Scholars maintain that violence is central to the drug market. It is the means by 
which order and hierarchies are maintained.24 This violence and the breakdown of the rule of law 
within inner city communities were the rallying cries for policy makers to bring back law and 
order. However, rather than address the underlying economic issues that created these problems, 
policy makers sought to address the symptoms—namely drug use and drug dealing.  
The turn to rule of man over the rule of law has had deeply entrenched negative impacts 
on communities of color. Indeed, one study found that 95 percent of inner city minority 
populations have been exposed to trauma, which was 20 percent higher than the national 
                                                           
21 Lusane, and Desmond, Pipe Dream Blues: Racism and the War On Drugs, 78; Staley, Drug Policy and the Decline 
of American Cities; Challenges of Crime.  
22 Staley, Drug Policy and the Decline of American Cities, 180.  
23 Lusane, and Desmond, Pipe Dream Blues: Racism and the War On Drugs, 80. 
24 Ibid.; Staley, Drug Policy and the Decline of American Cities, 100. 
  
14 
 
average.25 While scholars continue to study the role of trauma in an individual’s emotional 
development, there are several studies that identify some of its negative effects. One study found 
that 96.6 percent of individuals with substance use disorders had experienced at least one 
traumatic event in their lifetime.26 Scholars attribute this correlation to emotional deregulation—
which can be understood as an individual’s inability to properly “modulate feelings, behaviors, 
and psychological responses to events that elicit emotion.”27 This emotional handicap leads 
individuals to develop unhealthy coping mechanisms, which can often be manifested in drug use. 
Studies also show that exposure to trauma or abuse during childhood are “uniquely predictive of 
emotional deregulation beyond the effects of adult retraumatizaion.”28 Trauma is not limited to 
violent experiences but can also be defined by verbal or emotional abuse. Moreover, one study 
found that emotional abuse or a negative family environment “was significantly related to 
substance abuse use above and beyond the effects of physical and sexual abuse.”29 The rise in 
violence within inner communities undoubtedly paralleled a growing prevalence of emotional 
deregulation; based upon the findings of the various studies, it can be inferred that many of the 
individuals using drugs in these communities did so in an attempt to cope with the trauma they 
experienced as a result of the decaying inner city.  
In large part, the war on drugs was an effort to remedy these inner cities problems, but 
policy makers failed to address the underlying causes of these issues. Early in his presidency, 
Ronald Reagan declared that he wanted to end drug use in the United States. Despite this 
                                                           
25 Amar Mandavia, Gabriella G. N. Robinson, Bekh Bradley, Kerry J. Ressler, and Abigail Powers, “Exposure to 
Childhood Abuse and Later Substance Use: Indirect Effects of Emotion Dysregulation and Exposure to Trauma,” 
Journal of Traumatic Stress, (October 2016): 423. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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inability to accomplish this goal, the Reagan Administration praised themselves for the gains 
they did make. In a 1984 press release the administration highlighted their progress stating, “In 
the past four years, we have halted the continuing expansion of drug use which occurred during 
the Seventies. Although drug and alcohol abuse remain at high levels, the trend is down instead 
of up.”30 This quote highlights an important paradox within Reagan’s war on drugs in that he 
simultaneously praised his own actions while insisting that the nation was still in a crisis. Such a 
paradox reveals the disconnect between the Reagan drug war and the real drug problem in the 
United States.  Failing to truly understand the drug problem in the United States handicapped 
Reagan’s drug war. Rather than address the underlying issues which resulted in the rise of drug 
use and violence within the inner cities, the Reagan Administration sought to criminalize drug 
use. Born out of an essential disconnect and misunderstanding, Reagan’s drug war was built 
upon two central misconceptions. The Reagan Administration did not understand why 
individuals used drugs or why individuals entered the drug market. These misconceptions 
formulated the base on which Reagan built his drug war and explain why it failed. 
The most significant misunderstanding of the Reagan Administration was their failure to 
grasp why individuals turned to drugs in the first place. While the administration clearly could 
identify markers that gauged the likelihood an individual would turn to drugs in his or her 
lifetime, they did not base their anti-drug strategy around these characteristics. For example, in 
the introduction to the high-risk youth section of the National Drug Control Strategy, the Reagan 
Administration noted that, “substance abusing parents; physical, sexual, or psychological abuse; 
dropping out of school; pregnancy; economic disadvantage; violent or delinquent acts; mental 
                                                           
30 Summary of accomplishments, folder: Drug Abuse Materials-1986, Collection: David L. Chew Staff Secretary, Box 
3. 
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health problems; suicide attempt; and homelessness” were several, but not all, stressors that 
gauged an individual’s likelihood of using illegal drugs.31 However, rather than address the 
underlying issues that cause drug use—which they identified—the Reagan Administration chose 
to punish these individuals as if they were extreme moral deviants putting their quest for the next 
best high over the safety and security of their community. Indeed, the same document listed the 
guiding principles for preventing drug use among high-risk youth as “zero tolerance for illegal 
drug use by high risk youth, and the accountability of individuals, families, and communities for 
preventing and stopping illegal drug use among high risk youth.”32 Rather than offer solutions 
that address the issues they identified, the Reagan Administration denied any culpability in the 
creation or maintenance of these issues and pushed responsibility onto the communities 
themselves.  
It is alarming that the Reagan Administration understood the everyday stressors that lead 
to drug abuse among high-risk youth yet offered little advice to alleviate these problems. The 
first objective of the strategy was to “promote accountability for behavior among high risk 
youth.”33 This accountability was not in reference to school attendance, mental health, or 
pregnancy—referring back to the list of causes given by the Reagan Administration—but solely 
concerning drug use. This accountability also came in the form of punishment rather than 
counseling, after school programs, or community events. The second objective was to 
“strengthen high risk families.” This goal listed less problematic courses of action, most of which 
were community-based programs to teach parents how to stop drug use or intervene when it was 
                                                           
31  Toward A Drug Free America: The National Drug Strategy 1988, folder: National Drug Strategy Report Richard 
Porter, NBC Staff (1 of 6) RAC Box 2, Ronald Reagan Library, 14-15 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 15 
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already present. It also listed one action that included counseling for the parents of convicted 
juvenile drug users. The final two objectives offer little deviation in action from the latter. They 
also emphasized punishment-oriented programs and the dissemination of government produced 
literature on drug abuse. 34 
An important aspect of Reagan’s drug war was the demonization of the average drug 
user. Indeed, in a draft copy of the 1986 National Initiative on Drug Abuse the second major 
theme of the initiative read, “drug users are financing our Nation’s suicide.”35 The bullet points 
beneath the aforementioned headline stated that drug abuse was “a threat to national security and 
public safety” and “eroding the quality of education and the personal development of our young 
people.”36 What the Reagan Administration was attempting to do was to place the blame for all 
the problems the nation was facing on drug users. The crumbling inner cities, declining 
education, and national security were somehow all directly linked to the average drug user. Of 
course, there is no explanation in the document as to how this small population managed to cause 
such destruction. Effectively, the Reagan Administration was just throwing wild accusations at 
drug users in an effort to find a scapegoat for the country’s prevailing problems. 
The average drug user does not have the capacity to cause this much destruction. While 
there is not an easily accessible profile of the average drug user to calculate their impact on 
society, studies find that marijuana is the most widely used drug and that a majority of 
recreational drug users are employed.37 This was the critical disconnect in Reagan’s drug war. 
                                                           
34 Ibid. 16 
35 National Initiative on Drug Abuse Draft July 8, 1986, folder: Drug Abuse Materials-1986, Collection: David L. 
Chew Staff Secretary, Box 3  
36 Ibid. 
37 Henry S. Ruth and Kevin R. Reitz, The Challenge of Crime: Rethinking Our Response, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press) 2003, 220 
  
18 
 
The administration propagated an exaggerated understanding of the average drug user and the 
number of drug users in the United States. They maintained that drug use was a “serious threat” 
to the nation because drugs robbed the nation “of the creative genius and labors of so many 
Americans; it siphons resources from productive use into the coffers of international criminals… 
it threatens [the nation’s] children just as surely as did the most dreaded disease in the past; it 
tarnishes American prestige worldwide; and it casts a pall over the future of our children.”38 
They also seemed to believe that the number of drug users was much higher than it actually was. 
Indeed, the most frequently used drug was—and remains to this day—alcohol, a completely 
legal drug.39 Moreover, statistics from the 1988 National Household Survey of Drug Abuse 
reveal that the number of drug users did not have the capacity to unravel society from the inside 
out, as the Reagan Administration suggested. The study found that 36.6 percent of the population 
had used illicit drugs in their lifetime, 14.1 percent used in the past year, and only 7.3 percent 
used in the past month.40 While a substantial amount of people tried a drug during this time, the 
regular user made up a very small percentage of the population and did not have the capacity for 
destruction that the Reagan Administration claimed drug users possessed.  
This demonization of the drug user was a central pillar of Reagan’s drug war and to the 
growing incarcerated population. Just as he had to convince the public that drugs were enemy 
number one before he could wage a grand war against drugs, Reagan also had to convince the 
American people that it was not just the drug dealers and kingpins that brought harm into 
society, but also the average drug user. Indeed, in a draft copy of the 1986 National Initiative on 
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Drug Abuse, the Reagan Administration stated that there needed to be a “focus on drug user, not 
as victim, but as [an] irresponsible member of society.”41 The administration also used lose logic 
to convince the American public of the insidious effects of drug use. Reagan’s Secretary of 
Education, William J. Bennett, stated there were only “three ways for a teenager to support a 
habit, and none of them is legal. There is theft, there is prostitution, and there is dealing drugs to 
other kids.”42 This statement is false, however. Getting a job or saving allowance were two legal 
and safe options teenagers had to finance their drug use. The Reagan Administration was trying 
to scare the American people into supporting their efforts. They wanted the public to associate 
recreational drug use with the worst-case scenario. By masquerading the average drug user as 
culpable for society’s ills, Reagan opened the doors for Congress to enact mandatory minimums 
for simple possession, including the minimum of five years in prison for possession of five 
grams of crack cocaine.         
 With the drug user stigmatized as the scourge of society, what then becomes of the drug 
dealer? If the Reagan Administration threw so much condemnation on the drug user, how much 
more will the drug dealer receive? One clear difference exists in the Reagan approach to dealers 
and traffickers: the option of treatment. Throughout the 1988 National Drug Strategy—which 
outlined the federal government’s efforts to combat drugs for the year 1988— there was an 
emphasis on increasing the availability of treatment for addicted individuals. The Reagan 
Administration never listed this as an option for drug dealers. Of course, not all dealers use 
drugs, but the complete exclusion of dealers from the option of treatment signifies that the 
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Reagan Administration believed that either these individuals were too far gone to help or did not 
deserve the chance or help to turn their lives around.43   
 The Reagan Administration also fundamentally misunderstood why an individual entered 
the illegal drug market. They believed that the “potential profit [was] so seductive that the flow 
of drugs [continued] in spite of the tremendously increased risks traffickers have born.”44 Greed 
brought these individuals into the drug trade, and that choice needed to be punished. However, 
many individuals that actively participated in the drug trade were not there by choice but out of 
necessity. For some, they began dealing drugs to support their own drug habit. Others were 
brought willingly or unwillingly into the drug market by their significant other, forced to act as 
mules or carriers for the underground operation. Karen Blakney, convicted of converting powder 
cocaine to crack cocaine, described her descent into the drug market, “I became addicted to 
cocaine, but didn’t realize it at first and didn’t want to face it. I felt like I was supporting myself. 
I was out there selling it and nobody was giving it to me. I started seeing people turning tricks for 
it, but I never went through that stage.”45  
For a greater number of individuals, the turn to drug dealing was born out of economic 
necessity. Unable to find a job in the licit economy, they turned to the underground world of the 
narcotics trade. While many outsiders viewed this decision as a choice designed to earn the most 
amount of money in the quickest manner, it was at its core often a decision of desperation.46 One 
example of this is an incarcerated woman named Rae Ann. Rae Ann was a single mother of two 
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dependent on a monthly welfare check of $192. Describing her introduction into the drug market 
she recalled, “When I was introduced to selling drugs, I saw money. I saw a means to get a 
whole lot of things that I couldn’t have because I couldn’t work. I was a working person. 
Honestly, I would have preferred to work. I just felt so discouraged.”47  Rea Ann was arrested on 
2 counts of distribution of heroin for sale of narcotics, earning her two life sentences—which 
were eventually reduced to just one life sentence— for possessing just three bags of heroin. 
Remarkably, Rea Ann never actually sold drugs. As she puts it, “I wasn’t the seller. I was the 
holder.”48 Rea Ann was dating a dealer at the time of her arrest and would hold the drugs for 
him. For example, if they went out to a club to find buyers, Rea Ann would carry the drugs on 
her person while her boyfriend conducted the deal. Despite this, Rea Ann was still charged for 
distributing 3 bags of heroin, which she maintains she never sold.49  
 Also contradictory to the opinion held by the Reagan Administration is Phillipe 
Bourgois’s theory of “the culture of resistance.” Bourgois argues that  
rather than a culture of poverty, the violence, crime, and substance abuse of the 
inner city can be understood as manifestations of a ‘culture of resistance,’ a 
culture defined by its stance against mainstream, white, racist, and economically 
exclusive society. This culture of resistance, however, results in greater 
oppression and self-destruction. More concretely, resisting the outside society’s 
racism and refusing to accept demeaning, low-wage, entry-level jobs contributes 
to the sorts of crime, addiction, and intracommunity violence for which crack has 
become an emblem. 50 
Within this culture of resistance, there was a pride in avoiding the exploitation of the larger white 
dominated society within which many of these individuals experienced various abuses and 
discrimination working minimum wage jobs in the legal economy. The choice to join the illegal 
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market was more than just an economic decision. It offered “a sense of autonomy, self-worth, 
and an opportunity for extraordinarily rapid, short-term upward mobility that [was] only too 
obviously unavailable in entry-level jobs in the licit economy.”51 Activity in this illicit trade 
offered a sense of pride to individuals in these communities, as they avoided the mainstream 
economy and becoming modern day Uncle Toms.  
 This culture of resistance was an effort to find a place within a country that in large part 
operates against these individuals. Within mainstream society, these individuals had to change 
their attitudes, speech, and dress while still facing racism and working demeaning jobs. They 
were not attempting to operate outside of American society or create a separate economy but to 
gain a higher status in American society. As Bourgois states, “they are, in true American fashion, 
frantically trying to get their piece of the pie as fast as possible. In fact, they often follow the 
traditional U.S. model for upward mobility to the letter: aggressively setting themselves up as 
private entrepreneurs.”52  
 For a majority of individuals that participate in the drug market, their involvement did not 
come as an option they chose over several others. They had no other option. For some poor 
communities, there were simply no other viable economic opportunities. For the addicted, this 
was likely the only means of income they could maintain due to their addiction. For others, their 
significant other forced them to enter the market. Whatever brought them into the market, it was 
never somewhere they truly desired to be, but they were not given the tools to escape the 
underground market. Tragically, the Reagan Administration failed to grasp these concepts and 
instead viewed these individuals as heartless menaces to society.   
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 In a draft of the 1988 National Drug Strategy, the Reagan Administration recognized that 
“America’s drug abuse problem and attendant criminal activity are not sustained principally by 
the supply of drugs, but by the appetite of some Americans for illegal drugs.”53 They did not 
establish effective programs with the goal to end the stressors that lead individuals to drug 
addiction. As Bettie Gibson, daughter of two Mississippi sharecroppers, described her descent 
into drug addiction, “I started getting curious because it looked like they felt so good, and I just 
had so much pain. I didn’t like myself. I thought I never would reach my potential. At first the 
heroin seemed good, and then after I started taking it, I knew my life had become a whirlwind. It 
was going around and around, going nowhere, like a merry-go-round.”54 An inundation of anti-
drug posters and commercials would not have lessened Gibson’s desire to eliminate her pain. It 
may have delayed her descent into drug addiction, but what she truly needed was intense 
counseling and medication for her bipolar disorder. 
 A large portion of the Reagan Administration’s efforts in the war on drugs were directed 
at reducing the demand for drugs. They maintained, “Eliminating the demand for drugs is the 
key to a drug free future.”55 The administration hoped that harsh penalties and severe jail time 
would prevent individuals from trying illegal drugs. Discussing the role of schools in the fight 
against drugs, Secretary of Education Bennett praised high school principle Joe Clark for 
expelling three hundred juniors and seniors for “drug and disciplinary violations.”56 Bennett 
hailed Clark’s actions for sending a message and quoted Clark’s explanation of the situation, “‘I 
was not about to let three hundred hoodlums jeopardize the education of three thousand 
                                                           
53 Toward A Drug Free America: The National Drug Strategy 1988, 5. 
54 Johnson, Inner Lives: Voices of African American Women in Prison, 136 
55 Toward A Drug Free America: The National Drug Strategy 1988, 5. 
56 William J Bennett, Testimony Before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 7. 
  
24 
 
students.’”57 While efforts like this did temporarily impede the flow of drugs into a school or 
neighborhood, it did little to actually reduce the demand for drugs in a community.  
 At best, punishment oriented drug policies acted to contain the drug problem, not reduce 
or eliminate it. For Clark, the best-case scenario was the chance that he had found all the dealers 
in his school and that nobody attempted to take their place. However, too often in the drug 
market low level dealers, like the three hundred that Clark expelled, were the most expendable 
parts of any drug ring. They were like the mythical creature Hydra, cut off one head and two 
more take its place. Too often, there was a pool of young people desperately in need of money 
that were willing and ready to take the place of those caught by the law. Punishment based policy 
did not change the world that the customer lived in. These individuals were still subject to the 
same abuses, stressors, and traumas that led them to use drugs in the first place. The only thing 
that changed for them was the person who sold them the drugs, and if an individual was a hard 
core addict, like someone addicted to crack cocaine, they were likely deeply entrenched in a 
community of drug users and dealers, making it easy to find a new dealer.   
 In his testimony, Bennett praised the work of another high school principal, Bill Rudolph, 
for implementing tough policies in his school and the community’s response stating, “The drug 
crackdown at school was accompanied by a crackdown in the community, initiated by parents. 
The parents agreed on a curfew. They agreed to chaperone all parties, and to prohibit drinking 
and drugs. They called on another to check up on children’s whereabouts. And at night they 
waited up to meet their children when they came home.”58 At first glance, this strategy seems 
very effective, and it was in this community. However, this plan unfortunately does not work in 
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all communities. For example, poor communities dominated by single parent households who 
have to work more than one job logistically cannot implement this strategy. There was simply 
not enough time in the day for less advantaged families to practice this kind of surveillance on 
their children. So while it is a very effective strategy when employed, it simply cannot be 
replicated in the communities that need it the most.      
 While there was little information offered about the three hundred “hoodlums” that Clark 
expelled, it is important to consider how their expulsions impacted their futures.59 It was not 
specified whether these individuals were dealers or users nor what drug Clark caught them with. 
These teenagers could have been anything from first time pot smokers to meth dealers. All that is 
known is that these children were caught and immediately removed from the school. Clark did 
not offer them a chance to redeem themselves or change their behaviors. He simply kicked them 
out of school, taking away the most important tool to help students change their lives: an 
education. Despite all the rhetoric concerned about keeping children off drugs and helping them 
achieve a brighter future, children lose access to those concerns and help the moment they try 
drugs. For those setting the penalties in this severely anti-drug climate, the innocent potential 
victim transformed into a “hoodlum” immediately following their first use of any drug. There 
was no safety net or second chance afforded to these individuals. They had to be held 
accountable for their actions.  
 The refusal of government officials to empathize with drug users and dealers was the 
fatal flaw of the Regan drug war. Their choice to view dealers and users as deviants and 
criminals undercut their own goals to end drug use in the United States. Growing scholarship on 
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drug abuse has revealed a strong correlation between stunted emotional growth, trauma, and 
addiction.60 Yet the Reagan drug war did little to combat these stressors; their policies were 
directed at imprisoning drug law violators rather than giving them resources to change their 
behaviors. Ultimately, the Reagan Administration fundamentally misunderstood the drug 
problem in the United States. They saw the crumbling inner city and rise of violence as 
symptoms of rampant drug use in these communities, when the opposite was true. The 
subsequent policies sought to fight drug abuse to clean up the streets of the inner city rather than 
attempting an economic revitalization of these urban centers. This would have decreased the 
economic need that drove many to the drug market, thereby lowering the violence and traumas in 
these communities, which would result in fewer experiences that increased an individual’s 
likelihood to turn to drug use.    
 The Reagan Administration’s failure to truly understand the drug problem revealed its 
political priorities. Despite the large amount of money and resources directed to the drug war, 
little mental energy was dedicated to solving the problem. This was true for most policy makers 
focusing on altering the nation’s drug laws. Rather than an extended examination of the problem 
and a subsequent debate on the possible solutions, policymakers jumped to punish drug 
criminals. These hasty decisions, motivated by extensive media coverage of drug use in the 
nation, were justified by the belief that these individuals were helping more people than they 
were hurting. The stigmatization of the drug users and dealers undercut any sympathy that may 
have been extended to them, and they became a population whose future was unimportant to 
mainstream society and politicians alike. The public saw drug users and dealers as villains rather 
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than victims. It was these attitudes and poor decision making that enabled Smith’s— a twenty-
four-year-old mother who was not a user or dealer, just a girlfriend of a dealer—conviction of 
twenty-four years in prison. Despite her distance from her boyfriend Hall’s drug operation, 
because of her romantic relationship with a notorious drug dealer, she was sentenced to spend 
half of her life in federal prison. Smith was not alone in her victimization by prosecutors. 
Countless other women have been charged for drug crimes that they had little to no part in.61 
They are sentenced to draconian sentences because policymakers failed to understand what drove 
these women to get involved in the drug market to begin with. All that concerns prosecutors and 
policymakers was the fact that they were involved with drugs at all. That simple fact stripped 
these women of the right to empathy and resulted in their imprisonment. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
NEW GENERATIONS BELIEVING THEM FABLES 
The prevailing notion that the “vital national interest” of the United States was at risk 
brought Reagan’s drug war to life.62 Using inflammatory language and patriotic rhetoric, 
the Reagan Administration convinced the American people that drugs were the nation’s 
most dangerous enemy. Linking the future success of the nation to the end of drug use, 
the Reagan Administration claimed in their 1988 National Drug Strategy,  
Drug use jeopardizes America’s strength at home and abroad; it 
undermines the achievements of past generations, and threatens our future. 
Drug dependent Americans can not[sic] be the defenders of freedom in a 
dangerous world, or the guardians of personal liberty at home; nor can 
they set the economic, academic, and scientific pace for developed 
nations. Drug use places at risk the historic character of the American 
people, our liberties and our prosperity. And most chilling of all, it has 
already tarnished the legacy we leave to our children. If we do not solve 
the nation’s drug problem, future Americans will not inherit a land of 
limitless opportunity or share the vision of a better world that are 
foundations of our heritage as Americans.  
This patriotic rallying cry convinced a majority of United States citizens to 
support the cause. And why would they not have? Millions suffer the deadly 
consequences of drug abuse each year. It is a threat to Americans everywhere.
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Despite Reagan’s public promises, his efforts resulted less in ending drug abuse as and more in 
removing drug dealers, users, and suppliers from the streets and putting them in the prison.63  
 At the heart of the Reagan Administration’s war on drugs was its publicity campaign, and 
it was massively successful. The Reagan Administration wanted to change the liberal view s of 
drug use that grew during the 1960s and 1970s. It succeeded in this goal by employing 
celebrities, teachers, parents, Public Service Announcements, magazines, newspapers, television, 
and radio programs. This multi media overload was the key to changing public opinion. The anti-
drug campaign was necessary for the success of the drug war because the administration needed 
public support for its righteous cause. Before he could punish drugs as the United States’ greatest 
enemy, Reagan had to first convince the people that drugs were the greatest domestic threat to 
the nation. In a way, the Reagan Administration took a topic that was relatively unimportant to 
the American public, made it the most important issue of the day, and introduced conservative 
politicians to an avenue through which they could score easy political points with the Moral 
Majority. The same trajectory can be outlined for the media coverage of crack cocaine. Until 
1985, news outlets said little about the menace of crack cocaine in the news. However, following 
the death of college basketball star Len Bias, there was a media firestorm over crack that 
frightened the American public into accepting the harshest punishment ever given to a single 
drug.    
 This extensive publicity campaign against drug abuse began as a backlash against the 
drug culture of the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, a draft of the 1988 National Drug Strategy 
mentioned,  
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Throughout the 1970s, federal, state, and local anti-drug efforts were constrained 
by a national attitude toward drugs of benign neglect. Drug use was seen as a 
passing phase among youth, and some dangerously mistaken people even claimed 
that drug use was beneficial—that it could expand consciousness, spur creativity 
and increase mental capacity. Health and law enforcement agencies struggled 
against the popular notion that drugs were not a significant problem in the U.S.64 
The administration also noted proposed legislation between 1972 and 1981 that sought to 
decriminalize marijuana as proof of the unacceptable drug culture of the preceding decades and 
boasted that there were no national politicians proposing such a bill in 1988.65 There certainly 
was an about face in public opinion concerning drug use in the United States from the late 1970s 
to the 1980s. This change was necessary for the success of Reagan’s drug war and the 
implementation of the 100/1 crack cocaine disparity. So why the significant shift in public 
opinion on drugs’ relative threat to the nation? The answer is in Reagan’s anti-drug publicity 
campaign. 
 The publicity campaign was a constant in the changing efforts of Reagan’s National Drug 
Strategy. For each year, the Reagan Administration developed a National Drug Strategy to build 
off the previous year. Generally, these strategies were similar to each other, always containing 
the same six goals, ending with “increase public awareness and prevention.”66 For the 
Administration, this goal took precedent. They claimed, “The most effective weapon we have 
against illegal drugs is widespread public intolerance of illegal drugs and users.”67  
 The Reagan Administration’s strategy and publicity campaign emphasized personal 
responsibility and accountability. The 1984 National Drug Strategy stated, “Described simply, 
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real success is achieved when those people most affected by drug and alcohol abuse are directly 
involved in solving their own problems.”68 While this seems like a good plan of action, it failed 
to recognize the problems in the communities that were most heavily affected by drug and 
alcohol abuse.  For many of these communities, the families were stuck in cyclical drug and 
alcohol abuse, which was not easy to break. Many of these families battled structural inequality, 
poverty, and often racism. The pain of such experiences led many to seek relief in drug use. For 
these individuals, they did not see another reality. One example of this is an incarcerated woman 
named Cynthia, charged with the crime of murder. Cynthia had an extremely tumultuous 
childhood filled with divorced parents, domestic violence, and sexual abuse. Looking back on 
her childhood, Cynthia lamented that she “was considered a problem child…. I guess I had anger 
and I guess I was a kid crying out for help but didn’t realize it.”69 Cynthia dreamed of going to 
college and becoming a pediatrician, however she could not find a friend or family member that 
would take her to a college interview. She believed this was because nobody in her circle cared 
about her education or their own, and the hope for a college degree subsequently slipped through 
her fingers. To cope with her own pain and disappointment, Cynthia began drinking at sixteen. 
Recalling her turn to alcohol, Cynthia states, “I was depressed, but I didn’t understand that it was 
depression. Being [in prison,] I look back over my life and I realize the pattern.”70 Due to her 
socio-economic status and her home environment, Cynthia was not exposed to healthy coping 
techniques until her incarceration.  
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These individuals often also lacked the knowledge or resources to avoid the cycle of 
substance abuse. Donna, a Texas native and currently incarcerated woman who, battled intense 
racism throughout her childhood, noted one instance when she was beat up by a group of white 
kids. Being raised in what she deemed a “square” family, Donna was pressured to finish high 
school and attend college, which she did. During her junior year, though, she met a man who 
derailed her future. Unknowingly Donna began dating a pimp; after figuring this out, she insisted 
on becoming one of his girls too. This began a ten year long relationship filled with abuse and 
prostitution; Donna reflected on it,  
The way I saw it, I was his woman and I couldn’t leave. That’s your man, your 
pimp, and you stayed with him. That was the code, the ethic that you lived by…. 
The only way to leave him [was] to pay, to run away, or to get another pimp…. I 
thought that the violence was part of being a whore…. I used to cry. I was hurt, 
but I loved him so much. It had gotten so deep that I didn’t really know how pain 
felt anymore, because I had lost it. I had medicated my pain. My drug use started 
when I was about twenty-one years old. I started smoking weed, and I would 
drink. When he would hurt me and do things to me, I would go and drink. I also 
started taking pills. Then, I would go to work.71 
Both Donna and Cynthia were victims of abuse that struggled to cope with their pain. In 
fact, Cynthia, who was raped consistently by an uncle from the age of four until she was 
sixteen, never spoke of the abuse until she was in her forties and found a program about 
sexual abuse while in prison.72 Both women describe their drug and alcohol use as efforts 
to self-medicate their pain, and their subsequent incarcerations were consequences of 
their inability to properly cope with their respective abuses. Access to therapy, 
counseling, or mental health professionals could have significantly transformed their 
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lives, but their home environments and communities prevented them from accessing 
these vital services.73     
Within this publicity campaign, the Reagan Administration sought to change the 
acceptable language concerning drug use. The 1984 National Drug Strategy listed the 
discouragement of the “use of terms which foster misconceptions and hinder 
understanding of the nature of drug problems. These terms include ‘recreation use’ of 
drugs, ‘responsible use’ of drugs and alcohol, ‘substance abuse,’ ‘decriminalization,’ 
‘getting high,’ and defining drugs as ‘hard’ and ‘soft.’”74 While the Reagan 
Administration was not censoring the average citizen’s discussion of drug use, they were 
setting guidelines for the publicized discussion of the nation’s drug problem, and, 
essentially, controlling the conversation. Reagan’s immense popularity and the mandate 
that came with it provided enough pressure to force celebrities and public officials to 
follow his message. It was not necessary for Reagan to enforce an official censor on the 
discussion of drug use—which would be extremely problematic—because a simple 
discouragement from him carried enough weight because of his immense popularity. The 
administration used this to their full advantage and successfully swung public opinion in 
their favor, though how far that swing truly reached seems to have been shorter than the 
administration led Americans to believe.     
 In their quest to eliminate drug use, the Reagan Administration sought to highlight the 
dangers of drug use as a means of preventing the emergence of new users. Largely, this was why 
they sought to control the drug conversation.  Indeed, the 1984 National Drug Strategy stated, 
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“Ultimately, the demand for illegal drugs will be stopped only when Americans recognize the 
personal dangers and societal harms which result from the use of illegal drugs and take action.”75 
This was one manifestation of the Reagan Administration’s misconception as to why individuals 
turned to drugs. 
 One way this was achieved was through partnerships with broadcasting companies. For 
example, NBC ran ads, PSAs, news stories, and special television events in support of the drug 
war. NBC went as far as to partner with the National Institute on Drug Abuse to develop a 
month-long campaign to fight drug abuse entitled, “Just Say No: Don’t Be A Dope.” Nearly all 
of the material for the campaign was provided by Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign, 
including promotional materials, a PSA, and a five-part miniseries. 76 Also provided in the packet 
to NBC was a list of discussion questions for viewers. One of the questions read, “Do you think 
there is a direct relationship between drugs and crime? Would you support laws which call for 
(a) stiffening penalties for providing drugs to minors, (b) lengthening sentences for all kinds of 
drug trafficking, and (c) outlawing the manufacture and sale of drug paraphernalia?”77 While this 
question may have been included to simply stimulate discussion, it seems more likely that it was 
an attempt on behalf of the Reagan Administration to subtly gain support for its harsh drug 
penalties. This discussion question is emblematic of what the Reagan Administration attempted 
in its media campaign. It attempted to not only gain support for their own legislative agenda but 
also to convince the American public that drug use was a criminal act. The administration 
succeeded, not by telling the American public that drug users are inherent criminals but by 
ushering the reader to make the connection between drug use and crime themselves.  
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 NBC also agreed to run a thirty-minute special broadcast about the consequences of 
marijuana and cocaine in which doctors and treatment specialists discussed the dangers of the 
two drugs. The broadcast was a series of the most extreme stories of cocaine related death and 
addiction. A former stockbroker told about how cocaine took him from being a director in his 
company to a divorced father living alone. The narrator told a chilling story about a nineteen 
year old girl who died of an overdose after snorting cocaine one night. The broadcast went on in 
this fashion, intent on convincing people of the harms of cocaine. It then shifted its focus to 
marijuana, which interestingly enough they had little data with which to scare individuals into 
not using. There were no horror stories of marijuana leading people to do harder drugs. In fact, 
the only deterrent the special gave to individuals to keep them away from the drug was that “it 
does something to you.”78 One of the doctors interviewed for the special stated,  
It’s a common delusion that marijuana is a drug that doesn’t do anything to you. 
A drug that doesn’t do anything to you, nobody uses. People use marijuana 
precisely because it does something to you… I think the only people who can say 
that marijuana doesn’t affect their work, don’t have much of a job or don’t give 
much of a damn how well they perform it. Every marijuana smoker I’ve ever 
known will sit up ramrod straight and look very disturbed when I ask him if it’s 
okay then if the neurosurgeon who is gonna work on him should have a couple of 
joints before he goes into the O.R. Immediately, the most tolerant smoker 
becomes bigoted as heck. ‘No way, Doc. We don’t want none of that.79  
At almost every media junction, the Reagan Administration managed to include its anti-drug 
campaign, which allowed for its success. The administration inundated the public with anti-drug 
messages, and the public responded in kind. This was perhaps the most important tool that the 
Regan Administration deployed in the war on drugs. It was imperative to have the American 
public on his side in the drug war.    
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 Much of this publicity campaign involved not just the deglamorization of drugs but also 
the defamation of the drug user. In 1986 President Reagan stated, 
We mean to reach out to the drug user; and we mean to prevent others from 
becoming users. Our goal is not to throw users in jail, but to free them from drugs. 
We will offer a helping hand; but we will also pressure the user at school and the 
workplace to straighten up, to get clean. We will refuse to let drug users blame 
their behavior on others; we will insist they take responsibility for their own 
actions. And finally, first and foremost, we will get the message to the potential 
user that drug use will no longer be tolerated; that they must learn to ‘just say 
no.’80   
Reagan presented the average drug user as an individual that is incapable of taking responsibility 
for his or her own actions because of an exaggerated selfishness. This imagined drug user was 
solely concerned for him or herself, an image that politicians frequently presented in this tough 
on crime era.   
 This vilification of the average drug user acted as one of the most important aspects of 
Reagan’s publicity campaign. In almost every piece the Reagan Administration propagated, there 
was a significant effort to heap shame and disappointment onto the drug user. In an essay about 
cocaine circulated by the administration, the author chided cocaine users for choosing the 
“chemical high” over the “natural high,” stating that those who chose the chemical high “have 
not learned to exult in all that love and life and play and prayer have to offer.”81 The author went 
on to state,  
The natural high is always more certain in its effect, less risk laden in its pursuit 
and more productive in its result. And the natural high has it all over the chemical 
high in one other respect as well. The high from coke or smoke or dope or drink is 
self-limiting. With every drug effect ther comes the point where the more you 
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take, the less you feel. With natural highs one can always go deeper and deeper 
into the experience without exhaustion and without boredom. 82 
Such a description of drug users created the image that the drug user was somehow stunted, 
unable to engage fully with the majesties of the natural world. This image also insinuated that the 
drug user was lazy, that they chose the high that took less effort. Rather than praying or 
exercising, they chose the easy path to a good feeling through drugs.   
This essay reveals that the image of drug users that the Reagan Administration produced 
was demeaning and problematic. The author went on to discuss cocaine treatment, stating that 
“The cocainist has to do more than to stop taking coke. The pattern of self-centeredness, 
unconcern and infantile craving will assert itself again through the drug or some other 
unsatisfying, anti-social drama unless new values are established.”83 Here, it is clear that the 
author understood the drug user or addict to be an individual of corrupt character. It was not the 
drug that changed the individual, but an immorality within the drug user that he or she was 
responsible for controlling. To call drug abuse a “pattern of self-centeredness, unconcern, and 
infantile craving,” exposes how little the author understood addiction.84 This misconception 
about what drives an addict underwrote all the actions of the Reagan Administration against drug 
use and shaped the punishment for drug crimes.  
 The same antipathy is prevalent in the author’s comments on cocaine users’ priorities. In 
response to cocaine users that claimed coke was better than sex, the author contended,  
Though one might be inclined to judge that when people say that their drug is 
better than sex, it does not necessarily mean that the drug is all that good. What 
makes it seem so good may be a problem with the other half of that equation. One 
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could question whether a society that tends to reduce sexual intimacy to rubbing 
two bodies together, much the same as Boy Scouts rub twigs together to kindle 
flame, may have so diminished the sexual experience that a drug high could be 
preferred…. The comforting hope and the logic of planning for the future have 
been truncated by the menace of a self-inflicted end of history by way of nuclear 
war. We don’t know where we came from and we have no idea of where we are 
going. The culture is in vertigo, and cocaine sustains the excitement.85 
It is important to consider the author’s notion that the nation was losing control of itself. This 
was consistent with the ideals that the Reagan Administration propagated. Indeed, in a 
September 1986 address to the nation, First Lady Nancy Regan described how drugs shook “the 
foundations of all that we know and all that we believe in.” 86 These statements were designed to 
generate fear within the American public and drive them to take action against drug use. In the 
essay, the author manages to jump from the nation’s perverse understanding of sex to nuclear 
war without an explanation, but it remained a document that the Reagan Administration kept for 
some reason. This serves to show how disillusioned the Reagan Administration was with the 
drug problem in the United States. Either they truly believed what they were saying, or they were 
deeply misinformed on the issue. Either way, both explanations undermine the work that the 
Reagan Administration was doing.    
 The Reagan Administration successfully painted America’s drug issues as moral issues 
rather than mental or physical health issues in their campaign against drug use. The 
administration maintained, “An important change is the elimination of moral confusion 
previous[ly] associated with drug abuse. There is broad consensus across the United States that 
drug abuse is clearly wrong and individuals who take drugs or promote drug taking by others are 
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responsible for their actions.”87 While many would agree today—and certainly agreed during 
Reagan’s Presidency—that drug use is a moral offense, the labeling of simple drug use as an 
immoral activity seems to be a misnomer. For many, a moral distinction comes when one’s 
actions have negative consequences for others or when they violate a set of religious morals.   
 Another key component to the Reagan anti-drug campaign was the implementation of 
compulsory drug education in all public and private schools. The 1984 National Drug Strategy 
stipulated “for drug abuse education to be integrated into the public and private school programs, 
with emphasis on the destructive effects of drug use, including alcohol, on excellence in 
education, health and overall well-being.”88 While informing school-aged children about the 
dangers of drug use is important in creating well-informed citizens, it also brought about deeply 
ingrained disdain for individuals that used drugs and propagated unfair stereotypes onto drug 
users. For example, the Just Say No campaign distributed posters to schools that read, “There are 
two kinds of heads. The ones that wind up excelling in school. And the ones that smoke pot and 
do drugs. Which head you turn out to be is up to you. You can resist an offer of drugs. Just say 
no. You’d be surprised how well it works.”89 The Reagan Administration was arguing that 
academic achievement and drug use were mutually exclusive behaviors. One could not be a 
successful student if he or she chose to use drugs. 
 As early as 1984, the Reagan Administration began praising itself for the successful 
change in attitude of the nation towards drugs. The 1984 National Drug Strategy held that 
“Individuals have begun to take responsibility for educating themselves about drug abuse and 
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how to counter it. Individuals, groups, and business are willing to make a commitment toward a 
drug free future. Parents are willing and eager to get involved in improving the quality of life for 
themselves and their children.”90 While some may argue that the Reagan Administration was 
simply trying to bolster its own reputation by praising its own efforts, such self promotion was 
not all that necessary for the Reagan Administration. The American people, as evidenced in his 
landslide victories in 1980 and 1984, unprecedentedly supported Reagan. This statement is 
evidence of the success of his media campaign. In four years, Reagan was able to change the 
national opinion on drug use and abuse to one that favored harsh punishments and the 
elimination of drug use.   
 With the public’s attention focused on drug use, the rise of crack cocaine gave the media 
a topic to obsess over. The media’s fascination with crack began when comedian Richard Pryor 
sustained severe burns on his face and nearly died from an explosion resulting from freebasing 
cocaine—a method of smoking cocaine that gives a high similar to that of crack.  In 1980, there 
was little knowledge of freebasing. 91 Many viewed it as an extreme measure.  Lu Parker, a 
writer for the Chicago Metro News, described freebasing as an “experiment” outside of “the 
normal drug scene.” 92  Though individuals did not call it crack explicitly, Pryor’s accident was 
the first notice of the smoke-able form of cocaine in the mainstream media.  While Pryor’s 
accident drew attention to new forms of drug use, it would be another five years before the media 
obsession with crack would take hold. A few years after Pryor’s accident, the death of basketball 
superstar Len Bias sparked panic over crack.  The Boston Celtics drafted Bias in 1986 in the first 
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round of the NBA draft.  Bias, however, never played a minute in the NBA as he died of 
cocaine-related heart problems shortly after the draft. Bias’s death sent reporters into a 
whirlwind.  The death of a young man with so much ahead of him terrified the American people. 
Bias’s death brought the drug issue to the forefront of the American conscious, which the Reagan 
Administration had been working to do. People who had been previously untouched by drugs in 
the United States now felt like victims of the drug problem. Bias’s former coach, Charles “Lefty” 
Driesell, spoke out after Bias’s death stating, “‘These are not recreational drugs. They’re 
killers.’”93 Nathaniel Clay, a writer for the Chicago Metro News, wrote that the nation should 
mount “a concerted attack on drug abuse.”94 Though Bias’s toxicology report did not distinguish 
whether the cocaine in his system was powder or crack, his death inspired the media to wage 
their own war on America’s youngest drug, crack cocaine.  
 Writers warned not only about the physical dangers of crack, but also the dangers crack 
posed to society as a whole.  The media reported inaccurate statistics on crack use in the United 
States and engaged in exaggerated reporting to scare the American people.  This widespread 
publicity was a natural extension of the media campaign that the Reagan Administration had 
been conducting since his inauguration.   More media outlets than ever began reporting 
specifically about crack cocaine as the drug that would destroy the United States if it was not 
stopped. Few individuals addressed the problem with rationale and logistics.  The result was a 
public outcry against crack and demand for the passage of harsh drug legislation at the state and 
federal level. The New York Times declared that “the crack epidemic [threatened] the legitimacy 
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of government and the fragile fabric of civilized life.”95  The fear surrounding crack stemmed 
from its alleged cheapness, availability, popularity amongst youth, and addictiveness.  Time 
reported that crack was “priced so that almost anyone [could] afford it,”96 and Wayne McCarthy, 
homicide commander for Dade County, Florida, declared, “there is no such thing as a 
recreational crack cocaine user.  They are all terribly addicted.”97  Media outlets ran large 
numbers of articles filled with claims such as these, highlighting crack’s potential to harm people 
and society.    
 Following the example of the Reagan Administration, the media often used exaggerated 
rhetoric with the goal of scaring the American people when reporting about crack.  Writers often 
exaggerated the prevalence of crack use and the danger crack presented to the nation.  Clay 
described crack in Harlem as having “wiped out a sizeable segment of the younger generation 
there,” and “ordinary police means” as “wholly insufficient” to combat the terror in Harlem.98  
Clay’s assertion that traditional police tactics could not stop the spread of crack supports the 
work of scholars that note the African American community’s support for the war on drugs and 
the militarization of the police force. Baskett called the spread of crack a “deadly plague” and 
referred to New York as a “candy store for crack.”99  The New York Times declared that crack 
was “more than just another passing crisis.”  Crack posed “a much greater threat than other 
drugs,” and reached “out to destroy the quality of life, and life itself, at all levels of American 
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society.”100  Declarations such as these created fear among the American people, as they came to 
believe that crack had the power to destroy their lives and families.  
 Journalists were not alone in their sensational claims about crack, as many public figures 
made exaggerated statements when referring to drug dealers and users.  Hubert Williams, former 
President of the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C., called drug users “‘bums’” and 
“‘scourges.’”  Williams spoke about the dangers that drug users presented to society, “‘They 
afflict the economy through absenteeism, shoddy workmanship and drug affected decision-
making. They endanger the nation’s roads and highways and spread disease through infected 
needles.’”  Finally, speaking of the fate of drug users, Williams declared, “Drug abusers should 
be stigmatized for the damage they cause themselves and the terrible costs they impose on the 
rest of us.” 101 Such statements, especially coming from law enforcement officials, altered the 
way citizens and elected officials saw drug users. Sympathy was no longer an option for the 
addicted; to the majority of Americans, addicts were now selfish, harmful, and infantile. Other 
public figures, such as the Reagans, perpetuated falsehoods of the prevalence and destructive 
nature of crack in the nation.  In an address to the nation in September 1986, President Reagan 
described the emergence of crack as “an uncontrolled fire.” Individuals made claims such as 
these in an attempt to instill fear into the audience, and in that effort, they were successful 
despite the fact that the use of crack never reached the epidemic proportions that the media and 
the Reagans suggested.   
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 Another tactic used by the press and public figures was the demonization of drug dealers 
and the victimization of drug users.  Talking about new anti-crack laws in Illinois, Richard M. 
Daley, a Cook County State’s Attorney who, like his father before him, would go on to serve as 
mayor of Chicago, spoke of drug dealers selling crack to “their victims.” 102  Daley’s attitude 
suggested that the drug user played no part in his or her descent into drug use, but that the dealer 
forced individuals into drug usage.  Removing guilt from the user was dangerous.  The shift in 
guilt led prosecutors to punish the dealers in criminal trials over drug related injuries. After the 
death of Len Bias, Arthur Marshall, the state attorney for Prince Georges County, “vowed to 
develop a manslaughter case if the dealer who sold the fatal cocaine [was] identified.”103  
Marshall’s vow ignored the fact that Bias ingested the drugs of his own accord.  Declarations 
such as Marshall’s shaped the public view of drug dealers; they were predators. 
 Part of the media’s sensational reporting was bringing unnecessary attention to the 
physical appearance of crack dealers in an effort to scare the public.  Writers often described the 
clothing, accessories, or vehicle of dealers to create a paradox in the mind of the readers.  Peter 
McKillop, a writer for Newsweek, described a dealer, named “Eare,” as “a big-shouldered 
Trinidadian wearing gold chains and a diamond-studded bracelet with his name engraved on 
it.”104  McKillop did not point out the attire in an effort to familiarize the reader with Eare; on the 
contrary, McKillop identified the extravagance of dealer’s outfit because it was improbable that a 
man of Eare’s background legally could earn the wages to afford such attire.  Steven Havel, a 
Los Angeles police detective, described young people in the crack trade as “living a ‘Miami Vice 
fantasy—heavy gold chains, $200 sweat suits, 500SEC Mercedes, and $160 Porsche sunglasses.”  
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This was an attempt to expose to the impossibility that young teenagers in the ghetto could have 
acquired these expensive items through any legal means.  The same article—aptly entitled “Kids 
and Cocaine”—went on to describe a “young pusher… [driving] a $14,000 Toyota pickup and 
[wearing] a beeper to keep in touch with his supplier.” 105  Descriptions such as these highlighted 
the amount of money earned by crack dealers and further enhanced the panic surrounding crack.  
 Reporters often spoke of the crack trade as a lucrative business.  Newsweek described 
crack dealing as “creating enormous profits for drug traffickers.”106  Because there were no 
statistics on the monthly income of drug dealers, reporters often relied on the drug dealers to 
discern their income.  One easily could over or under estimate that amount.  For instance, 
McKillop, reporting on crack dealers in Times Square, stated that “Eare” claimed to earn 
$12,000 a week.107  George Hackett and Michael Lerner, writers for Newsweek, lamented, “the 
money from crack dealing is so good that some law-enforcement officials are switching 
sides.”108      
 At the root of the panic, people were worried about their children. A woman wrote a 
letter to Dr. Charles W. Faulkner, a columnist for the Chicago Metro News, expressing her fear 
that her children would get into drugs and asking for guidance.  Faulkner commended the woman 
for taking action and urged other parents to teach their children about the dangers of drugs as 
early as seven years old.109  Kevin McEneaney, the Director of Clinical Services at Phoenix 
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House, concluded that “‘the most vulnerable population [to crack was] adolescents.’”110 Herman 
Keith, a Democrat from Yonkers, New York, declared, “If we don’t stop crack now, it will 
destroy our young people.”111 Reports such as these only increased the panic over crack.  
Journalists created the idea that all teenagers were at a severe risk of developing a crack 
addiction. This fear grew out of crack’s cheap street price; just twenty-five dollars could buy two 
rocks of crack cocaine.112 Coupled with reports that it was instantly addictive produced a genuine 
fear among American parents. With reports of crack’s widespread availability, parents worried 
that one bad decision would end with their children horribly addicted.  
 Writers were not the only members of the African-American community speaking out 
against crack and drug use; rap artists began writing songs warning about the dangers of crack.  
Rapper General Kane wrote “Crack Killed Applejack,” which quickly became very popular 
across the nation.  Chicago Metro News reported that “Crack Killed Applejack” was “the most 
frequently requested recording on inner-city radio stations.”113  General Kane’s anti-crack 
message suggested that a majority of African-Americans and inner-city residents were fearful of 
the crack epidemic and did not participate in the crack trade.  This idea contradicts the popular 
image that ghettos were havens for crack addicts; inner city residents were just as fearful of crack 
as those in any other portion of the nation.  Grandmaster Flash and Melle Mel also produced a 
popular track “White Lines” that contained an anti-crack and cocaine message.  “White Lines” 
reached the Billboard hot R&B/Hip Hop Tracks chart in 1983, before the obsession with crack 
epidemic reached its full height. It is important to note that these artists were spreading anti-drug 
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messages, combating all the stereotypes thrown upon rap and hip-hop music that they glorified 
drug use and a violent lifestyle.   
 With the African-American community already in opposition, one factor that created 
alarm with white Americans was the spread of crack to the suburbs. Andrew Malcolm, a writer 
for the New York Times, told the stories of several addicts from the middle class: a banker, 
homemaker, and assembly-line worker. Malcom stressed crack’s ability to cross class lines. Lee 
Chase, a recovering addict interviewed by Malcom, stated, “‘There’s more crack than ever now. . 
. .   But these middle-class types have got jobs and savings and checking accounts. So it takes 
longer to burn through their lives.’“114  Harold E. Adams, Commissioner of the Nassau County 
Department of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, stated, “‘There is also another additional population 
using crack: the older professional, family, respectable middle-class person. We’re seeing 
doctors, lawyers, engineers and Wall Street people who are addicted.’”115  Stories such as these 
made the crack epidemic more relatable for a large portion of Americans.  Coverage of middle-
class and suburban crack use drove home the fear of crack’s propensity to ruin lives, especially 
lives of people that have been viewed as beyond the reach of drug addiction. 
 Media coverage of the crack epidemic did not slow after 1986 and the passage of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. If anything, crack reporting became more dramatic in 1988, 
furthering the widespread hysteria. Michel Marriott, a journalist for the New York Times, 
reported that despite all the legal action taken against crack, “the presence of crack [was] more 
pervasive, more violent and more insidious in its effect on New Yorkers, particularly the poor” 
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than three years earlier.116 Newsweek referred to the United States as “the Crack Nation… an 
America craving nothing but the synthetic euphoria of a terrible and addicting drug.”117 These 
reports were simply not true. In 1988, only 7.3 percent of the United States population had used 
crack cocaine in the past month.118 This was not representative of a nation consumed by crack 
cocaine. Also, it’s worth noting that the only thing synthetic about crack cocaine was the 
addition of baking soda. All other components of the drug were naturally occurring. 
 The media frenzy over crack brought the drug war onto the main stage of 
American politics. Surveys found that a majority of Americans thought that drug use was 
the number one problem facing the nation.119 Despite the unprecedented amount of 
attention given to a single drug, the media’s crack frenzy was dependent upon the 
publicity work of the Reagan Administration in the earlier parts of the decade. The two 
forces, the media and the Reagan Administration, depended on each other for the 
circulation of their message and support for their cause. The Reagan Administration’s 
war on drugs depended on media outrage over drug use to win the support of proposed 
legislation. Likewise, reporters depended upon the Reagan Administration’s anti-drug 
campaign for the American public to buy into their message.  The unprecedented public 
attention to drugs in the 1980s brought about a series of new laws, which included harsh 
punishments for drug crimes.  This frenzy created a new outlet in which politicians began 
fighting each other to see who could be the toughest on crime and drugs.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THEY GOT A WAR ON DRUGS SO THE POLICE CAN BOTHER ME 
 
With the media storm concerning drug use, particularly crack cocaine, federal politicians 
jumped on the opportunity to gain support through the swift passage of harsh drug laws.  
Crack was at the center of this new wave of proposed legislation. The varying penalties 
were erratic and the quantities needed to trigger a mandatory sentence were seemingly 
random choices. Despite his early work to combat drug use in the nation, President 
Reagan’s own suggested punishments were often dwarfed by the proposals of Congress. 
Within this legislative frenzy, the 100/1 crack cocaine disparity was established. Its path 
through the federal legislature included no mentions of racial bias or clear discriminatory 
intent on behalf of Congress or President Reagan. Indeed, biased police practices 
solidified the racial component of the 100/1 disparity. Police action guaranteed that more 
African Americans were subject to discrepant federal cocaine laws and created the 
association of Black Americans with crack cocaine.
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The Fall of 1986 saw the introduction of dozens of anti-drug bills designed to enhance 
the penalties for drug possession and dealing. Included in this wave of legislation was a bill titled 
“Emergency Crack Control Act of 1986.”120 Interestingly enough, this specific bill did not 
establish mandatory minimums regarding crack cocaine but stated an individual caught with at 
least five grams of “cocaine freebase, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of not more than 20 years or a fine not more than $250,000, or both.”121 Despite its lenience in 
punishment when compared to other bills, the Emergency Crack Control Act of 1986 still 
overinflated the drug problem in the United States stating that “drug abuse among young 
Americans [was] a national crisis.”122 This claim is a stark contradiction to the claims of 
President Reagan who, in September of that same year, stated, “The number of individuals who 
are using illegal drugs has stabilized in most categories and decreased in several, most notably in 
the high school.”123 These contradictory claims made just weeks apart reveal that the grandiose 
claims of elected officials about the corrosive effect of drugs on the United States were done in 
an effort to generated fear among the American public.  
 Inconsistencies in proposed drug punishments—notably for crack cocaine—suggest that 
elected officials practiced fearmongering in order to achieve their political ends. Two other 
proposed bills offered two new sentencing structures for crack cocaine—revealing the lack of 
knowledge of crack cocaine and drug problem as a whole. The Comprehensive Narcotics Control 
Act of 1986 proposed a mandatory minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment without 
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parole for the possession of five grams of crack and 500 grams of cocaine.124 This sentencing 
structure would go on to be incorporated into the cumulative Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 
President Reagan made his own proposal for changes in drug laws to Congress in The Drug-Free 
America Act of 1986. Strikingly, President Reagan set a higher amount of crack cocaine to 
trigger a mandatory sentence. In his plan, 25 grams of crack or 500 grams of cocaine was 
required to trigger a mandatory five year prison sentence without parole.125  
The fact that Reagan’s proposal was one of the most moderate sentencing structures 
reveals three important dimensions of the drug war. First, the Reagan Administration’s media 
campaign against drug abuse was massively successful, not just with the average citizen but also 
with lawmakers. Second, concerning drug penalties, the Reagan Administration was not the most 
punitive force in the United States during the 1980s. Third, the Reagan Administration alone 
cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the drug war. The United States Congress is 
equally culpable as Congressional members introduced more punitive legislation and a higher 
number of anti-drug bills.126    
 While the Reagan Administration certainly spearheaded the crusade against drug use, 
there was substantial Congressional support for the Reagan drug war. Indeed, Republican 
Georgia Congressman Newt Gingrich outlined a proposed war on cocaine and heroin. In it, 
Gingrich proposed  
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Dramatically rais[ing] the penalty for use of cocaine and heroin. Possibly set a 
10% gross assets fine for first use, 20% for second use, 30% for third use. The 
host of a party with multiple use of cocaine and heroin should automatically be 
fined 30% on first offense. The goal is to set a fine so steep that movie stars, rock 
stars, athletes, and professionals in the community (doctors, dentists, architects, 
etc.) simple could not afford to play with cocaine. The goal is to dry up the market 
by frightening away anyone with money.127 
Gingrich’s lack of empathy for drug users and call for harsh penalties was consistent with that of 
the Reagan Administration and much of Congress. It is important to note the widespread support 
for the harshness of the drug war. The Reagan Administration was not acting alone or against 
much opposition in their crusade against drug use. Gingrich’s failure to understand the true 
causes of drug use and addiction also parallel with the Reagan Administration. They both did not 
understand that the threat of penalty would not curtail an addicts withdrawal symptoms or their 
insatiable desire to use. Many addicts use to the point of financial ruin before encountering the 
law, rendering these financial penalties irrelevant. With or without the fines, these individuals 
would remain in the situations that drove them to drug use, and if they were searching for peace 
in drugs, they were unlikely to give up that search because the punishment got more severe. 
Individuals caught in the snares of drug abuse do not consider the legal penalties when they use; 
they are simply trying to feel better.  
 Gingrich’s proposal contained some suggestions that exceeded the harshness of the 
proposals of the Reagan Administration. Gingrich’s plan included close monitoring of the 
judicial branch to ensure that drug dealers were punished to the full extent of the law. He  
suggested, “Mandatory sentences as prescribed in Duncan Hunter’s H.R.1946 should be imposed 
and judges should be reviewed to determine if anyone is routinely letting off convicted users or 
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dealers.”128 While the Reagan Administration did advocate for unnecessarily harsh penalties for 
drug violations, none of their suggestions for the drug war attempted to violate the separation of 
powers between the branches of government. Gingrich’s proposal would have stripped the 
Judicial Branch’s ability to empathize with individuals in drug cases. Mandatory minimums strip 
judges’ ability to tailor an individual’s punishment not only to their specific offense but also to 
allow a judge to consider the forces driving an individual’s involvement with drugs.  
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was the culmination of dozens of bills proposed by 
Senators and Congressmen to toughen drug penalties and increase law enforcement’s ability to 
arrest and prosecute drug criminals. One of the most notorious aspects of this bill was the 
creation of the 100/1 crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity. While it took 500 grams of 
cocaine to trigger a minimum sentence of five years in prison, only five grams of crack cocaine 
was needed to trigger the same sentence. This disparity was a response to the public panic 
concerning crack, which was fueled by the media craze over the emergence of crack. Though not 
discriminatory in its language or creation, in the years to follow minorities and the poor would 
disproportionally suffer at the hands of this disparity, prompting outrage and reconsideration. In 
the immediate aftermath the passage of the bill, however, Congress sought to enhance the 
punishment for drug criminals of all sorts. These plans eventually culminated in the 
implementation of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
In his signing remarks for the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, President Reagan once 
again offered a sentiment that was more empathetic than his policies. In it he states, “We must be 
intolerant of drugs not because we want to punish drug users, but because we care about them 
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and want to help them. This legislation is not intended as a means of filling our jails with drug 
users. What we must do as a society is identify those who use drugs, reach out to them, help 
them quit, and give them the support they need to live right.”129  However, neither the bill he 
signed into law that day nor its sister legislation that will be signed two years later provided 
individuals caught in the snares of drug abuse the help they truly needed.  
 Take for example, Donna, an African American woman whose drug use and criminal 
lifestyle has created a pattern of incarceration in her life, which she desperately wants to break. 
Discussing the origins of her drug use Donna recalled her abusive boyfriend, “It had gotten so 
deep that I didn’t really know how pain felt anymore, because I had lost it. I had medicated my 
pain. My drug use started when I was about twenty-one years old. I started smoking weed, and I 
would drink. When he would hurt me and do things to me, I would go and drink. I also started 
taking pills.”130 Throughout her multiple criminal litigations, Donna did not go before a judge. 
She accepted the plea bargains offered to her because she did not have the finances to hire her 
own lawyer and did not want to risk getting a harsher penalty from the judge. However, going 
before a judge could have given Donna the outlet to expose her abuser, receive help getting out 
of that relationship and potentially start her on a path of healing that ended with a turn away from 
drug use. Instead, Donnas’ life was characterized by abuse, drug use, prostitution, and 
incarceration.  
                                                           
129 Ronald Reagan, Presidential Remarks: Signing Ceremony For Drug Bill, October 27, 1986, folder: Drug Abuse 
Policy- October 1986 (3), Box 26, collection: Ralph C. Bledsoe Files Domestic Policy Council, Ronald Reagan Library. 
130 Paula Johnson, Inner Lives: Voices of African American Women in Prison, New York University Press: New York, 
2003, 111. 
  
55 
 
 In the midst of her cycle of drugs and incarceration, two things changed for Donna that 
helped her begin to straighten out her life: she converted to Islam and received a new counselor. 
Speaking of these two events’ impact, Donna recalled, 
I also got a new counselor. This guy was really good. He talked to me and he told 
me that I had a lot of anger issues that I needed to set free. He told me that I didn’t 
have to keep using drugs and killing myself. He said that I could be a gift to 
society, to my people, to myself, and to my daughter and my family. But, first, I 
had to learn to love myself…. Even after I converted to Islam in 1981, my real 
power was not strong enough when it came to drugs. When I have a crisis now, 
these sisters—the Joyces—tell me when I’m doing wrong. I have this guilt, this 
shame about me. In Islam, if you do wrong, you walk in shame for four months. 
I’ve done this a couple of times. But each time I go, I get back into this drug 
thing, or the money situation.  I was too proud to ask my friends or family to help 
me with rent, or a car note, so I went where I knew the fast money was. I will 
have to use the tools that they taught me in counseling to cope with these things or 
I will keep doing the same things and keep getting the same results. I’m getting a 
little stronger; I’m getting a little better. I have times when I want to give up, but I 
just try to pick myself up and try not to use drugs. I want to do things 
differently.131  
Donna’s life is an example of the futility of punishment oriented drug policy. In Donna’s home 
community, incarceration was so frequent that one was not “considered a real street player if you 
didn’t go to prison.”132 Prison was almost a rite of passage in the eyes of Donna’s community, 
invalidating the fear that the Reagan Administration and Congress hope to instill through harsh 
punishments. The ineffectiveness of harsh penalties is again highlighted by Donna’s fight to get 
off drugs. She notes that it wasn’t until her counselor gave her the tools  to battle her addiction 
that she felt she could truly conquer it. While Donna was imprisoned again in 2003 on drug 
charges, she maintains her resolve to continue fighting against her urges to use drugs. 
 A year and six months after the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, federal 
officials began discussing a new comprehensive anti-drug bill. Despite a clear reduction in drug 
                                                           
131 Ibid, 113-114. 
132 Ibid, 112. 
  
56 
 
use, and the first ever reduction in cocaine use, members of Congress still maintained that the 
nation’s drug problem was a “dire emergency.”133 While the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
establish harsh prison sentences for drug criminals, politicians next looked to handicapping drug 
offenders after their stint in prison by limiting the kinds and amounts of government aide these 
individuals could receive after drug law violations. Despite earlier statements claims to want to 
help the user and not to jail them, this new legislation represented a change in attitude toward 
“intolerance and individual responsibility.”134    
 The new round of proposed bipartisan legislation concerning drug use added new depth 
to the harshness of drug penalties in the United States. The Gekas Amendment proposed “the 
death penalty for those who commit murder in the course of a drug felony and to establish 
constitutional procedure for the imposition thereof.”135 The Rangel Amendment—proposed by 
New York Democrat Charles Rangel—sought to establish “mandatory life imprisonment for 
those who commit murder in the course of a drug penalty.”136 Predictably enough, in their review 
of the proposed amendments, the Reagan Administration maintained that they preferred the 
Gekas Amendment to the Rangel Amendment as it offered harsher penalties for the same 
criteria. Further walking back their claims to want to help rehabilitate drug users, the Reagan 
Administration supported the Davis Amendment which deleted “provisions that [required] the 
National Institute of Corrections to establish and operate a national training center for training of 
Federal, State, and local prison officials in drug rehabilitation programs. These programs 
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[served] criminals convicted of drug related crimes or who have developed drug 
dependencies.”137 
 Once again, the Reagan Administration’s actions did not match up with their rhetoric. 
While they spoke of wanting to rehabilitate the user and bring them back into mainstream 
society, they did not support proposals that sought to do so. The Davis Amendment would 
eliminate the most useful tool in helping convicted drug criminals begin a new life within the 
law. On top of this, the Reagan Administration also refused to support legislation that 
appropriated over $2.5 billion for treatment and rehabilitation centers for the States.138 While the 
Reagan Administration did approve increases in funding for mental health and rehabilitation 
centers, those budgetary increases in no way compared to the increases made in law enforcement 
and prison budgets. In fact, the 1988 bill included amendments that significantly increased the 
reward for law enforcement officials who arrested major drug traffickers and ear marked seized 
funds for the federal prison budget.139 Despite the clear conflict of interest between the arrests of 
criminals, the seizures that coincide with those arrests, the increase to officers’ pocket books, and 
the federal prison budget, the American public offered widespread support for the tough new 
legislation.  
Throughout the Reagan Administration’s crusade against drug use, there was a massive 
increase in drug law enforcement spending. From 1981 to 1987, federal spending for drug law 
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enforcement virtually tripled from $700 million to $2.1 billion.140 This increase was a natural 
extension of the drug war, as it emphasized drug use as a criminal offense. Tragically, the 
increase in law enforcement budgets was not paralleled with a comparable increase in funding 
for treatment and rehabilitation centers. While there were increases in grants to state and local 
governments, they paled in comparison to the massive increases to law enforcement budgets. 
This comes as a stark contrast to Reagan’s promise that the goal of his administration was “not to 
throw users in jail, but to free them from drugs. [And] offer a helping hand.”141  
 A look at the Reagan Administration’s strategy for treatment of drug users reveals a 
larger disconnect between the administration and the best way to achieve their goal of a drug free 
America. For their new treatment plan, the Reagan Administration sought to expand resources to 
intervene “during the early stages of drug use, i.e., before severe drug problems and habits begin 
to develop.”142While this makes sense in the Reagan Administration’s mentality, it did not 
address the real drug problem in the United States. These individuals were not fully addicted or 
financially drained. As the Reagan Administration noted, these individuals were “more likely to 
have other financial resources including private insurance, personal finances, and employee 
assistance programs than members of the endemic group [hardcore addicts].”143 They also noted 
that individuals in the epidemic group—early stage drug users—were “more likely to return to 
full occupational potential following intervention,” and that “resources necessary to treat the 
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epidemic population [were] considerably less than those required to treat the endemic group of 
severely addicted individuals.”144 
 Not only was this plan not addressing the real drug problem in the United States, it was 
also not the most economical use of federal funds directed at drug treatment. That the most 
severely addicted were not the focus of Reagan’s treatment plan reveals just how flawed the 
Reagan drug war truly was. The problems that the drug war sought to resolve—drug related petty 
crimes, negligent parents, lack of productivity, and more—grew from the behaviors of the 
seriously addicted, not moderate or light users. While the logic of the Reagan Administration’s 
choice to focus on the epidemic group can be followed, these individuals were not yet a danger 
to themselves or their communities in respect to their drug use, and the members of the endemic 
group certainly did present dangers to themselves and their community. Subsequently, it is clear 
that the endemic group needed treatment exponentially more than those in the epidemic group 
did, to protect the individual and their community.  Moreover, as the Reagan Administration 
noted, individuals within the epidemic group retained more financial resources than those in the 
endemic group and consequently a better means to finance treatment on their own.145 While 
treatment for the epidemic group was cheaper than that for the endemic group, the funds used to 
fund treatment for light or moderate users could have been diverted to the treatment of heavy 
drug users, who have fewer resources to fund their own treatment. Such a plan would have 
addressed the real drug problem in the United States rather than just the drug problem in 
suburbia.       
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The federal government also exposed its own hypocritical nature in the 1986 report of the 
working group on drug abuse policy. In it the Reagan Administration concedes that “drug abuse 
treatment is primarily a state and community responsibility.”146 While the federal government 
did offer support in the way of funding and block grants for treatment and rehabilitation centers, 
these investments were nowhere near the amount divvied out to state and local law enforcement 
agencies. Though one could argue that this was simply a result of the separation of powers 
outlined in the Constitution, it seems more accurate—given the Reagan Administration’s pattern 
of differing rhetoric and action—that the federal government was more concerned with 
punishing addicts rather than helping them conquer their addiction.147 It is also worth noting the 
economic implications of the federal government’s actions concerning drug use and abuse.  It is 
not fair to state that the Reagan Administration consciously decided that mild drug users 
deserved aide from the federal government because they often belonged to a higher economic 
class than the hard core addicted. However, the Administration did offer more resources to the 
individuals in better economic standing and left those entrapped in cycles of poverty addiction to 
the care of state and local officials. 
 In addition to impacting policing patterns and expanding the prison industrial complex, 
these portions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 mandated significant changes to crack 
sentencing and post prison penalties for drug criminals. Following the signing of this bill into 
law, crack cocaine became the only drug whose first time possession charge came with a 
mandatory prison sentence. Though it contained no racially biased language, policing practices 
made this sentencing structure unduly harsh to the African American community. In addition to 
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the stiffer penalties for drug possession and dealing, separate stipulations in the bill revoked 
federal benefits to individuals convicted of drug possession or dealing. This included access to 
grants, contracts, loans, licenses, and public housing.148 The post prison punishments forced onto 
drug criminals is the key to the new system of control, which Michelle Alexander deems “the 
new Jim Crow.”149 These legal discriminations stunt the progress a former convict can make. 
Already subject to job discrimination due to their criminal record, these new revocations of 
federal benefits make in nearly impossible for formerly incarcerated individuals to make a living 
inside the law, increasing their likelihood of returning to the illegal practices that first brought 
them to prison.   
  As evident in their vocal support for harsh drug penalties, the Reagan Administration 
sought to bring the full weight of the law down on those who used or dealt illegal drugs. In the 
1984 National Drug Strategy they stated, “Judges, probation officers and parole boards should 
give full recognition to the seriousness of drug offenses. Judges should provide for strict 
sentencing, to include just punishment for first time offenders in drug trafficking cases.”150 This 
demonstrates that the Reagan commitment to toughness was already cemented in 1984. It is also 
an example of the Reagan Administration’s glorification of harsh penalties. This praise exposes 
how calloused the Reagan Administration, and the American public, were to the plight of 
addicts. As already discussed, there was little empathy extended to these individuals. While this 
kind of emotional detachment seems common between those who break the law and those who 
make and enforce it, it is not conducive for trying to solve the nation’s drug problem. Emotional 
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connectivity and support are much more likely to turn a potential or current user from drugs and 
strict punishments. However, this was the vital misunderstanding of not just the Reagan 
Administration but policymakers at all levels of government and tragically became the mantra of 
those enforcing the law.  
 The racial implications of the legislation passed by Congress and signed by President 
Reagan were not in the legislation themselves but in the practices of the police. Once again there 
was a great disconnect between the rhetoric of Reagan’s drug war and the implementation of it.  
Despite the race-neutral language of the new drug laws, law enforcement official began arresting 
racial minorities—most notably African Americans—at significantly higher rates than White 
Americans, despite the fact that White Americans consumed illegal drugs in larger numbers. The 
1988 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found that 37 percent (totaling 58,041) of 
White Americans had used illicit drugs in their lifetime. While 32.3 percent (totaling 4,823) of 
Hispanic Americans and 35.9 percent (totaling 7,999) of Black Americans had used illicit drugs 
in their lifetime.151 These biased policing practices grew out of centuries long held notions that 
Black Americans were more naturally inclined to commit crime. While law enforcement officials 
cited higher crime rates in minority neighborhoods as justification for their heavier police 
presence, a majority of these crimes were drug related crimes. This raises the question: Is there 
really more drug trafficking in these neighborhoods or is it a matter of over policing? A look into 
the differences between markets in the inner city and suburbs gives insight into this question.  
 The key difference in the markets in the inner city and the suburbs was location. While 
suburban drug transactions were frequently conducted indoors, inner city drug deals were 
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conducted in outdoor public spaces.152 The public nature of the inner city markets made these 
individuals exponentially easier to apprehend than dealers in suburbia, especially when one 
considers legal practices such as stop and frisk where the New York City police had the authority 
to stop anyone on the street and frisk them if the officer suspected the individual possessed 
drugs. Given the fact that many urban dealers returned to the same public location to conduct 
business, it was very easy for officers to track down dealers and arrest them in the act of selling 
drugs. By contrast, suburban dealers were much more protected from the prying eyes of the 
police.153 Their neighborhood offers them a level of protection. Speaking of the privilege 
inherent in suburban neighborhoods, scholars Jeffrey Reiman and Paul Leighton write,  
The factors more likely to keep one out of trouble with the law and out of prison, such as 
suburban living room instead of a tenement alley to gamble in… are the kinds of things that 
money can buy regardless of one’s race, creed, or national origin…. Drug arrests re most easily 
made in “disorganized inner city” areas, where drug sales are more likely to take place and out-
of-doors, and dealers are more willing to sell to strangers.154  
The ease with which inner city dealers could be arrested as compared to suburban dealers 
constitutes a large part of why African Americans were arrested more frequently on crack 
cocaine charges than White Americans. Moreover, suburban police departments often do not 
have Special Weapons and Tactic (SWAT) and other paramilitary subsidiaries, specialized vice 
departments, and are largely more informal in their interactions with the private citizens of the 
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area. Inner city neighborhoods generally have more militarized police and overall can be 
described as “occupied space.”155     
 One way biased policing manifested was through discrimination based on physical 
appearance. William Bennett, Secretary of Education, praised one school for their identification 
of drug dealing students in his testimony before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control stating, “Recently, narcotics officers arrested several Washington students for 
selling drugs to their classmates. The students were identified by their expensive clothing and the 
electronic pagers they carried to ensure that classes did not interfere with sales.”156 While the 
race of these students was not identified, a measure of profiling is inferred from Bennett’s 
statement. Though not clearly stipulated, it is obvious that the student’s expensive clothing and 
pagers signaled to the officers that they were engaged in some sort of illegal activity. It is unfair 
to state that it was obviously race that signaled to the officers that these individuals were dealing 
drugs, but something about the appearance of these children told the officers that these students 
could not afford those items legally. 
 Police also developed tactics that sought to arrest drug criminals through targeted efforts 
and excessive stops. One of the most common ways officers find drugs and make arrests is by 
pulling drivers over and asking to search the vehicle. Despite their lack of a warrant, nervous 
about saying no to the police, citizens often allow the officer to conduct a search even if the 
individual has drugs in the car. Indeed, a 2004 study found that 98 percent of task force searches 
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were conducted on the legal basis of verbal consent at the time of the stop.157 In addition to 
geographic and clothing discrimination, officers were more likely to pull over minority 
individuals rather than White ones. One 1992 study found that Florida state troopers pulled over 
and searched African and Hispanic Americans 80 percent of the time in Volusia County, despite 
the fact that they only made up 5 percent of the driving population.158 A 2001 ACLU 
investigation found that Black Americans in Oakland, California were twice as likely to be 
stopped by police and three times as likely to be searched.159 Building off of targeted 
enforcement, officers also often conducted large amounts of traffic stops with the sole intention 
of finding drugs. One California police officer described it this way, “It’s sheer numbers…. 
You’ve got to kiss a lot of frogs before you find a prince.”160     
Because of these biased police practices, crack cocaine use and dealing became 
associated largely with African Americans. Despite Household Surveys that found that 52 
percent of those who reported crack use in the past year were white, the 1995 Sentencing 
Commission found that 88.3 percent of federal crack cocaine convictions were African 
American. 161 The important thing to note here is that police action dictated the beliefs about 
African Americans and crack cocaine. Because they were so highly prosecuted for crack related 
crimes, the American public began to see crack cocaine as a uniquely black drug. This 
misconception in addition to the media hysteria in the mid 1980s kept crack penalties 
unnecessarily harsh despite claims of racial bias. The anecdotal claims about crack’s 
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addictiveness and ability to incite violence stopped elected officials from attempting to remedy 
the broken system.    
 This concern with the minimal harms to the privileged classes in the United States over 
the injustices enacted over the poor and minorities is also reflected in overall attitude of not just 
the Reagan Administration but also members of Congress. Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) 
stated before Congress, “Let’s face it, we are in deep trouble with drugs. No longer is the 
narcotics issue a matter of junkies lounging in the ghetto streets.”162 Here Rangel was not 
trivializing the impact of drugs in the ghetto, but expressing his concern about the prevalence of 
drug use throughout the United States. The Regan Administration reflected this sentiment in the 
1984 National Drug Strategy stating, “While improved mechanisms exist for the treatment of the 
hard-core drug users, the large number of experimental drug users necessitates that we develop 
and implement new strategies to halt this epidemic.”163 Once again, the logic of the federal 
government is baffling. Rather than focus on the individuals causing actual harm to society 
through their addictions, the Reagan Administration chose to focus on the casual user who 
maintains control over their life when the true need was with those whose lives were spiraling 
out of control.  
 Many of the Reagan strategies listed the top priority of federal law enforcement agencies 
as individuals of high rank within national and international cartels. In the 1988 National 
Strategy Against Drug Use stated, “The leadership of drug organizations, often insulated against 
the actual drug operation but growing rich off the profits, must be targeted and attacked. 
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Frequently, sophisticated financial investigations are the only avenue to attack these 
criminals.”164 However, a majority of the individuals brought into the criminal justice system for 
drug related crimes were low level individuals. For example, the Regan Administration boasted 
in 1984 that the number of average monthly drug related convictions had risen to 921, but only 
252 of those convictions were top-level organizers or financiers.165 Once again, it is clear that the 
federal government under President Reagan was not addressing the real problem in regards to 
drug abuse. What the Reagan Administration failed to understand was that their efforts were not 
actually stopping the flow of drugs throughout the country but merely changing the hands that 
the drugs flowed through. Arresting fifteen drug dealers in Compton did not mean that the drugs 
that those fifteen individuals customarily dealt were now gone, it just meant that someone else 
was selling them, whether it be a new dealer or one that was fortunate enough to not get caught.   
 With the close of the Reagan era, pressures to remain tough on drugs and crime did not 
lessen. Indeed, President George H.W. Bush continued Reagan’s push against drug use and harsh 
penalties for criminals. However, 1990’s saw a shift in public opinion concerning the harsh 
penalties for crack cocaine. The New York Times ran a series of articles outlining the racial 
implications of the 100/1 sentencing disparity. In response, President Clinton signed legislation 
directing the United States Sentencing Commission—a body created to ensure equality in 
sentencing structures—to investigate federal cocaine sentencing structures and report their 
findings. Despite the progressive approach to drug law by some, a majority of Americans, 
including those in the Congress, opposed the weakening of drug laws. It is in this changing 
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environment with liberals calling for softer penalties and conservatives reaffirming the touch on 
crime mantra that President Clinton attempted to reform the 100/1 disparity. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS 
 
Too often in a discussion of drug crimes, people see only in black and white—not only in 
a racial sense, but also in the metaphorical sense. They see those who abide by the law 
and those who do not. Often times, a full investigation into a criminal’s background is not 
conducted, because the only thing that matters to most is the fact that they broke the law, 
not what drove them to break it. In this unforgiving system, individuals like Kemba 
Smith fall between the cracks. Arrested for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in 
1994, the court sentenced Smith to twenty-four years in prison with no chance of parole. 
Smith was only twenty-four years old at the time of her sentencing, a student at Hampton 
University, and a mother to a four-month-old baby boy. None of this could change the 
court’s decision though. From a legal standpoint, justice had been served; Smith broke 
the law and now faced the consequences.166
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However, drug abuse and non-violent drug crimes are rarely this black and white. Drug 
abuse and drug crimes often are not representative of some inherent character flaw; they often 
are born out of abuse and structural inequality. Policy makers are largely unconcerned with what 
drives an individual to drugs. They want to be understood as tough on crime and to be tough on 
crime, a politician must forget the human cost of their legislation and instead view them as 
hardened criminals undeserving of a second chance. To punish individuals convicted of non-
violent drug crimes as criminals rather than victims of abuse and systemic oppression is a further 
act of violence against them. Smith was such a victim.  
While for many individuals caught in the criminal justice system abuse starts at a young 
age, this was not the case for Smith. Her early life was not without hardship but was largely 
representative of the ideal family life. Smith lived in a white-dominated suburb of Richmond, 
Virginia with both parents. She was the ideal child: well-behaved, good student, and involved 
with many school and community activities such as Girl Scouts, Brownies, Students Against 
Drunk Driving, Future Homemakers of America, and the foreign language club. Smith’s early 
life offered no indication that she would face twenty-four years in prison at the age of twenty-
four. Things changed for Smith in college when she began dating a man named Peter Hall. Hall, 
unknown to Smith, ran a large scale drug operation in Virginia. By 1994, Hall was put on the 
U.S. Marshals’ most wanted list. Hall also physically abused Smith and eventually forced her to 
participate in his drug operation.167  After months of fleeing the police, authorities tracked down 
Smith and Hall and arrested them.  The court levied crack cocaine related charges against Hall 
and Smith, which is why Smith’s sentence was so long. Crack is one of the most harshly 
punished drugs in the U.S. criminal justice system.  
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Instituted by Ronald Reagan, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 established severe federal 
sentence structures for crack cocaine. Crack became the only drug with a possession charge that 
included a mandatory prison sentence. Possession or dealing of as little as five grams of crack 
cocaine triggered a minimum of five years in prison. Crack’s sister drug, powder cocaine did not 
carry such a harsh sentence. In fact, it took one hundred times the amount of cocaine to trigger 
the same prison term.168 This 100/1 disparity proved problematic because of its racial 
implications. President Reagan and Congress did not seek to establish a racially biased 
sentencing structure, but due to law enforcement practices and systemic inequality, African 
Americans suffered more frequently from this sentencing structure than any other race. Despite 
the fact that white Americans consumed crack in higher numbers than any other race, crack 
quickly became viewed as a uniquely black drug; one that preyed not only on African Americans 
but also brought violence and pain into their communities.169 
Scholars studying the war on drugs often take a broad approach. They analyze the war on 
drugs as a whole rather than addressing a single drug within a president’s tenure in office. This 
macro approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the ways in which the war on 
drugs has incarcerated minorities disproportionately. This chapter, by contrast, takes a micro 
look at crack legislation during the Clinton Administration. This approach offers more insight 
into the actions of lawmakers. It enables the close analysis of policymakers’ choices and if they 
could have taken a different direction. A macro approach to the war on drugs often suggests 
inevitability, while a micro approach identifies the specific choices politicians made concerning 
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drug legislation. A tight focus reveals specific notions that drove policy decisions rather than just 
examining the effects of the legislation.170  
Discussing notions of black criminality in the Progressive Era, historian Khalil 
Muhammad writes, “African American criminality became one of the most widely accepted 
bases for justifying prejudicial thinking, discriminatory treatment, and/or acceptance of racial 
violence as an instrument of public safety.”171 Indeed, Muhammed’s claim can be applied to the 
topic of crack cocaine. African American criminality became one of the most widely accepted 
bases for justifying the stark differences in sentencing for crack and cocaine and acceptance of 
the unnecessarily lengthy prison terms for African Americans as an instrument of public safety. 
During the Clinton Administration, this reasoning and the notion of black criminality came under 
scrutiny, as did the racial injustice of the 100/1 sentencing discrepancy. Elected officials, 
appointed commission members, politicians, and journalists identified the problems with federal 
cocaine sentencing structures. These individuals presented their concerns to Congress and 
President Clinton and proposed remedies to the situation. Despite the rational evidence presented 
to them, Congress and President Clinton opted for harsh penalties. They made this decision for 
political expediency in the era of “tough on crime” politics. Indeed, individuals within the 
Clinton Administration understood that the most sound policy decision concerning federal 
cocaine sentencing structures was not the policy they chose. Instead, they opted for the tougher 
legislation that would have fewer political costs. Exaggerated fears surrounding crack cocaine 
that played off long standing notions of black criminality justified this decision.       
                                                           
170 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New 
Press, 2010);  Elizabeth Hinton. From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in 
America. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Michael Fortner, The Black Silent Majority: The 
Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).  
171 Kahlil Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011): 4. 
  
73 
 
Essential for a discussion of the 100/1 disparity is critical understanding of the two drugs’ 
capacity for destruction. In 1995, the U.S. Sentencing Commission examined the 100/1 disparity 
and the two drugs in depth.  They found that “cocaine in any form—paste, powder, freebase, or 
crack— [produced] the same physiological and psychotropic effects.”172 This made sense, as the 
two drugs are chemically identical and psychologically addictive. There was nothing within the 
drug itself that made it any different from powder cocaine. The route of administration created 
different effects for crack users than some cocaine users. As the Sentencing Commission found, 
“the route of administration determines the intensity and duration of these effects. For a given 
quantity of cocaine, smoking crack cocaine and injecting powder cocaine produces the most 
intense physiological and psychotropic effects.”173  However, smoking crack was easier and 
more pleasant than injecting cocaine, and based on these facts, the Sentencing Commission 
determined that smoking crack appeared more tempting to the first time or frequent user than 
injecting cocaine. It begs repeating though that crack and cocaine were capable of causing the 
same amount of harm; it was what the user chose to do with the cocaine that determined its 
danger level, while crack was always in its most dangerous form.174  
Despite the identical chemical makeup of the two drugs, crack’s supposed unique ability 
to ruin not just the lives of individuals but entire communities scared a majority of Americans. 
Of chief concern to many was the belief that crack was instantly addictive; many worried that 
just one experience with crack would send anyone spiraling into an addiction.  The stereotypes 
surrounding “crack heads,” as crack addicts became known, formed the basis of the rest of the 
fears surrounding the drug. Americans saw crack users as drug-crazed individuals concerned 
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only with their next high, and people believed that crack retained a unique ability to inspire 
violence, either within the drug market or within users themselves. In their minds, crack was 
unraveling the social fabric of America’s inner cities. Crack babies and crack-addicted mothers 
were the rule rather than the exception, in the minds of many. Apart from its addictiveness, the 
most common fears vocalized about crack was its impact on the poor and young. Concerns that 
America’s youth would turn to crack before other drugs and that the poor would only further 
enable their poverty grew out of the cheap price of crack. Taken together, these fears formed the 
basis of logic behind the stringent policies on crack.175 These fears remained in the minds of 
many as President Clinton attempted to reform federal cocaine sentencing.  
In 1994, The Omnibus Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act directed the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission to examine the federal penalty structures regarding all forms of 
cocaine and provide recommendations for the modification of these structures. The next year, the 
Commission reported their findings and recommended an equalization of penalties for crack and 
cocaine at the federal level. The Commission also established a set of guidelines that would 
allow for the harsher punishment of crack or cocaine when a case involved any of the social fears 
surrounding cocaine such as but not limited: to the involvement of youth, violence, guns, 
parental neglect, or prior criminal records.176 The recommendation was highly contested amongst 
the members of the Commission, with a four -three vote approving the measure. Without an act 
of Congress to reject its recommendations, the Commission’s guideline system would become 
law after 180 days.177 
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During their investigation, the Sentencing Commission came to conclusions that 
combatted some of the assumptions about crack. The Commission noted in their introductory 
remarks that “despite the unprecedented level of public attention focused on crack cocaine, a 
substantial gap continues to exist between the anecdotal experiences that often prompt a call for 
action and empirical knowledge upon which to base sound policy… policy makers must draw 
conclusions cautiously.”178 While the Commission found more violence within the crack trade 
than in the cocaine trade, they attributed the violence to the new nature of the market rather than 
having to relate to crack itself. With the accusation that crack turns its users violent, the 
Commission found no evidence that crack or powder cocaine “excite or agitate users to commit 
criminal acts and that the stereotype of a drug-crazed addict committing heinous crimes is not 
true for either type of cocaine.”179In contrast, the research revealed that alcohol was most likely 
to turn individuals to commit domestic violence. The Commission also found little evidence to 
suggest that crack users are more likely than powder cocaine users to commit crimes to support 
their drug habit.180 
One of the most notable concerns about crack was the rise of crack babies and neglectful 
mothers too concerned with getting high to take proper care of their babies. The Sentencing 
Commission found no evidence to support the notion that the rate of babies born addicted to 
crack was on the rise or ever very high. They noted that no studies had been done on the issue 
and a lack of empirical evidence to support these claims; in fact, “much of the evidence… 
[came] from news magazine reports as opposed to medical and scholarly journals.”181 Many drug 
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tests also did not differentiate between crack and cocaine, making it impossible to determine if 
one substance was more harmful to babies and mothers than the other. However, the Sentencing 
Commission was able to outline the potential risks posed to babies exposed to crack cocaine in 
utero and the dangers of drug addicted parenting.   
A major concern for the Sentencing Commission itself was the racial bias surrounding 
the 100/1 disparity.  In their review of the creation of the crack and cocaine sentencing 
structures, the Commission found no evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of Congress in 
setting the different punishments for the two drugs. They also found that courts levied out 
sentences equally regardless of race for both drugs. However, the Commission did note that a 
comparison of the two drugs revealed the 100/1 ratio “to be an unduly high ratio, [and] the vast 
majority of those persons most affected by such an exaggerated ratio are racial minorities. Thus, 
sentences appear to be harsher and more severe for racial minorities than others as a result of this 
law, and hence the perception of unfairness, inconsistency, and a lack of evenhandedness.”182 
While the Commission could not condemn the established 100/1 ratio as inherently biased, they 
could and did point out the clear problems with it. Despite the lack of evidence, the 
Commission’s chairman stated that their theory “was a law, no matter how well-intentioned it 
was, if it’s causing such discrepant results, then the law has to be changed and a new method has 
to be installed.”183  
The Clinton Administration and a substantial portion of Congress opposed the 
Commission’s recommendations. H.R. 2259—the bill that rejected the Sentencing Commission’s 
1995 recommendations—maintained that the current sentencing structure was favorable to the 
Commission’s suggestion on the basis that it was more punitive. Congress held that the 
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Commission’s sentencing range “would fall below the statutory mandatory minimum sentences 
for [crack penalties,] thus resulting in greatly reduced sentences for crack cocaine trafficking 
offenses than is currently the case.”184 In a statement by the President, he affirmed his support for 
Congressional rejection of the guideline system: “I am not going to let anyone who peddles 
drugs get the idea that the cost of doing business is going down.”185 While both parties opposed 
the proposed guideline system, they both agreed that the current 100/1 ratio was too great and 
warranted some reconsideration. Both parties also acknowledged the “concern about racial bias 
arising from the current penalty structure,” but reaffirmed that justice was dulled out equally 
among federal prosecutors and there was no racial intent behind the legislation that created the 
disparity. 186 For supporters of the legislation, these facts alleviated the racial concerns 
surrounding the 100/1 disparity, buying into the adage that these people broke the law and should 
accept the consequences.  
However, there were detractors from the Congressional majority who made their opinion 
abundantly clear in their dissenting views. In their opening paragraph, the dissenting members of 
Congress called the current 100/1 sentencing scheme, “blatantly discriminatory federal laws.”187 
The dissent not only condemned the discriminatory laws, but also the individuals who enforce 
them, highlighting that “federal agents have focused their resources in minority communities, 
where [the] crack trade is believed to be the most prevalent and violent.”188 Resulting from this 
targeted enforcement the dissent noted that, “not a single white has been convicted of a crack 
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cocaine offense in federal courts serving Los Angeles and its six surrounding counties since 
Congress enacted its mandatory sentences for crack dealers in 1986.”189 These individuals forced 
the racial issue back into the conversation. They demonstrated to the supporters of the bill that 
there were real racial consequences of the current sentencing structure. However, the majority 
remained unmoved by the clear racial imbalance of justice.  
 During the House subcommittee on crime’s hearings over the proposed changes to the 
sentencing structure, Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General, gave an official statement on 
behalf of the Department of Justice and the Clinton Administration.  Harris condemned the 
Commission’s equalization of crack and powder cocaine because it did not properly address the 
negative impact crack had on communities across the nation. The prospective change in prison 
time for crack offenders served as a major point for Harris’s argument. She reiterated the 
common equation put out by the Clinton Administration, which compared crack sentences under 
the mandatory minimums with the new guideline systems as a fear-mongering tactic. Harris 
chose to compare penalties for distributing fifty grams of crack, which under the standing 
mandatory minimums triggered a ten-year sentence that had the potential to be reduced to four to 
ten months of imprisonment or probation with home detention in the new guidelines system. 
Rather than acknowledge the potential the new guidelines had to reduce the burden of crowded 
prisons or the damage done to individuals in prison, Harris declared that this new sentencing 
structure sent a message to crack dealers “to expand their operations in response to a windfall 
reduction in the cost of doing business.”190  
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This was not the first time someone within the Clinton Administration used the phrase 
“the cost of doing business” in regards to drug dealers, and the sentiment attached to this phrase 
warrants some analysis. Looking first at President Clinton’s usage, he stated that he did not want 
drug dealers to get the idea that the cost of doing business was going down.191 Here, the concern 
was to keep people away from drugs and the drug trade through harsh punishments. Clinton’s 
remarks suggested nothing about the nature of people involved in the crack market. Harris’s 
statement however, reveals a sentiment about those involved with crack. Harris asserted that in 
lieu of harsh punishments, the crack problem would only get worse because the individuals 
involved with the crack trade would make the crack problem worse with their newfound 
freedom. The picture that Harris projected was one of an evil drug dealer whose only purpose in 
life was to sling crack; there was no course for redemption. She did not see the possibility of 
someone turning away from the crack trade and starting a life within the law. Harris’s perception 
of crack dealers was a racist exaggeration of a heartless thug only concerned with getting paid.  
In her statement, Harris referred to many of the anecdotal fears surrounding crack to 
justify different punishments for crack and powder cocaine and the rejection of the 
Commission’s proposal.  Harris preyed on longstanding racialized fear surrounding crack and 
U.S. paternalistic instincts throughout her statement. She claimed that crack had become “readily 
available to a large segment of our population, including our most vulnerable—the poor and the 
young.”192 This statement was flawed on more than one account. First, Harris claimed crack was 
available to a “large segment of our population.”193 While crack technically was available to 
anyone wanting to purchase, the 1994 National Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) 
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found that only 1.3 million people used crack cocaine in the last year, and only four million 
reported using crack cocaine in their lifetime.194 There is also no evidence to support Harris’s 
claim that the poor are uniquely burdened by crack, as neither the NHSDA or the Sentencing 
Commission investigated class in relation to crack usage. However, there was a correlation 
between education and crack usage. The NHSDA found that individuals without a high school 
diploma reported the most crack usage within the past year.195 While many link a lack of 
education to class, the connection is not solid enough to justify the mobilization of Congress’s 
paternalistic nature to maintain the 100/1 ratio that disproportionally incarcerates African 
Americans at an alarming rate. Harris’s charge that the young were disproportionally affected by 
crack was misleading as well. While crack usage in the past year was highest among individuals 
twenty-six to thirty-four, it was a meager 1.3 percent of that population.196  
Many of the claims made by Harris were distortions of the evidence used by the 
Sentencing Commission. The Commission was careful to avoid any declaratory statements 
regarding the differences between crack and cocaine. For example, when discussing which form 
of cocaine was more addictive, the Commission stated that “the form of cocaine can be an 
adequate proxy for addictiveness when the cocaine is in crack form, but an inadequate proxy 
when the cocaine is in powder form.”197 While both crack and powder cocaine retain the same 
capacity for addiction, the Commission found that smoking crack cocaine was the preferred 
method to injecting cocaine and determined that usage trends could allow for a higher penalty for 
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crack cocaine, though they urged the creation of a precise formula to calculate the greater 
dangers of crack cocaine. The Commission never stated that one base drug was inherently more 
addictive nor did it explicitly advocate for a higher penalty for crack over powder cocaine.198 
Harris, however, took the Commission’s findings and compared the Commission’s information 
on crack to snorting cocaine, which offers a completely different comparison than smoking and 
injecting. After presenting her analysis, Harris declared that “crack is more psychologically 
addictive than cocaine powder,” which the Commission’s report clearly found false.199 
Ultimately, both houses of Congress voted to approve the bill, and it was sent to the President’s 
desk. 
In the days following the Congressional vote, prisoners in five different federal 
penitentiaries expressed their discontent with the decision via “disturbances,” as the New York 
Times declared them.200 In Memphis, prisoners started a fire at the Federal Correctional Institute. 
At the Greenville, Illinois Federal Correction Institute, inmates took control of most of the 
housing unit after refusing to return to their cells. Guards then barricaded themselves in an area 
that was not easy for prisoners to reach. 150 inmates got involved in a fight in the dining hall in 
Allenwood, Pennsylvania during which time a female guard was burned by hot liquid being 
thrown in her face.201 Despite the seemingly clear cause and effect relationship between the 
uprisings and the denial of the Commission’s recommendations due to their chronology, prison 
officials denied any link between the two. A spokeswoman for the chairman of the Judiciary’s 
Committee’s subcommittee on crime stated, “It may suit some people’s agenda to attribute the 
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riots to the vote, but we have no indications that that is true.”202 This statement was painfully 
misguided. What else would have garnered enough emotion to provoke incarcerated individuals 
in five different penitentiaries in five different states to rebel at the same time? It is not 
particularly easy to organize an  interstate protest from a prison cell, and as one prisoner rights 
advocate noted, inmates around the country were watching the debate around crack unfold. 
Juanita Hodges, president of the prisoner advocate group Seekers of Justice, Equality and Truth, 
stated, “All during the Congressional debate, I was receiving telephone calls from brothers in 
prison who were watching developments. The violence was because of Congress’s vote.”203    
After passage through Congress, President Clinton signed the legislation into law, 
officially rejecting the Commission’s proposal and ordering the Commission to reevaluate the 
sentencing structure and submit a new proposal. In an official statement, Clinton stated that he 
was committed to the message that “drugs are illegal, drugs are dangerous, drugs may cost you 
your life—and the penalties for dealing drugs are severe,” and famously declared that he was 
“not going to let anyone who peddles drugs get the idea that the cost of doing business is going 
down.”204 A concern for appearing “tough on crime” motivated this decision. It was necessary 
for Clinton to project a tough image; his opponents would use any semblance of softness in 
regards to crime against him. It was an easy strategy for politicians to use to gain favor with the 
public.  
The violent response to the Congressional vote serves as a reminder of the human 
casualties of the war on drugs and the 100/1 disparity. Smith was not the only victim of the 100/1 
sentencing ratio by any means. However, Karen Blakney’s story has a less cookie cutter 
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beginning than Smith’s. Blakney was a drug addict with a record of petty crimes that was 
incorporated into a crack deal by a pair of drug dealers. Blakney was not originally involved with 
the deal. After the two dealers sold a large quantity of powder cocaine to an undercover DEA 
agent, the officer “demanded crack to enhance the potential sentence.”205 The pair then brought 
in Blakney to cook the powder. The agent paid Blakney $100 in government funds for the 
service, after which time the three individuals were arrested and brought to court under the 
jurisdiction of Judge Luis Oberdorfer.206  
Judge Oberdorfer saw Blakney’s tragedy as it really was. The federal sentencing structure 
mandated that Blakney be imprisoned for a minimum of ten years while her sentence would have 
been lowered to three years had she been involved with powder cocaine rather than crack. Judge 
Oberdorfer saw no reason to imprison Blakney, a mother of seven, to ten years in prison, calling 
that punishment “cruel and unusual and in violation of the Eighth Amendment,” and instead 
sentenced Blakney to a three-year prison term.207 Blakney served her full three-year sentence 
with commendations from her warden while her case appeal was pending. Nineteen months after 
her release, the Court of Appeals ordered Blakney—at the time drug free, employed, and 
pregnant with an eighth child—to serve the seven years left on her crack sentence. Judge 
Oberdorfer did all he could within the court system to stop Blakney from having to return to 
prison for seven more years.  
The Court struck down Judge Oberdorfer’s pleas and requested Oberdorfer remove 
himself from the case. Seeing no other viable options, Oberdorfer turned to President Clinton, 
requesting clemency for Blakney. Oberdorfer suggested that President Clinton write an 
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Executive Order “grounded on the President’s power to ‘Reprieve and Pardon’ to commute the 
sentences of certain non-violent drug law violators.”208 Judge Oberdorfer condemned the 
prevailing 100/1 ratio calling it “arguably the most fragrant practice of racial discrimination by 
the federal government since President Truman integrated the Armed Forces 50 years ago.”209 
Pleading with President Clinton to grant clemency to Blakney, Oberdorfer highlighted the cruel 
nature of sending her to prison for another seven years stating that “returning Blakney to prison 
for another 7 years would be, for me, too much like enforcing the pre-Civil War Fugitive Slave 
Laws.”210 President Clinton did not step in on Blakney’s behalf, but she did not have to serve the 
extra seven years. Because of her change of lifestyle, another court decided to put Blakney on 
probation for five years.211      
With individuals like Smith and Blakney in mind, the Sentencing Commission released a 
second report with recommended changes to the 100/1 ratio in 1997. Under the direction of 
Congress and the President, the Commission re-examined the two drugs and their respective 
impact on society. However, in their report to Congress, the Commission retained that “the 
guidelines approach allows for the more refined and individualized sentencing that Congress 
envisioned under the Sentencing Reform Act as well as the most efficient and effective use of 
scarce federal prison resources.”212 Despite this conviction, the Commission conducted new 
research and submitted new recommendations to Congress. The Commission recommended 
changing the quantities that trigger a mandatory five year sentence for both drugs. They 
recommended reducing the current 500 gram trigger for powder cocaine to a level between 125 
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and 375 grams; for crack cocaine, they recommended raising the current five gram trigger to a 
level between twenty-five and seventy-five grams.213    
With the new recommendations from the Sentencing Commission, the Clinton 
Administration mobilized to garner support for the change they now felt comfortable supporting. 
In an email in a discussion about the Administration’s stance on the new recommendations, one 
staffer suggested continuing to “bob and weave—we overcame the worst of this once before. 
The upcoming Sent Comm [sic] report will cause a bit of a fuss but it will blow over quick.”214 
However, an urge from the Attorney General to “address and take action on this issue” quickly 
followed the initial suggestion.215 Despite the fact that the Clinton Administration attempted to 
garner support for the new proposal, the email reveals the politics involved with the 
Administration’s handling of the crack cocaine disparity. They turned away from the most sound 
policy—as will be discussed next—and chose the option that would earn the most political 
points.216  The willingness and readiness of the Administration to abandon amending the current 
sentencing structure is also apparent in this email. The staffer minimized the importance of 
remedying the disparity and the concrete impact that change would have. It affirms the notion 
that the Clinton Administration was minimally concerned with the disparity or its racial 
implications; in their minds, it would “blow over quick.”217 
A June 12, 1997 draft proposal from Attorney General Janet Reno and Director of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Barry McCaffrey problematizes the Clinton 
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Administration’s support of the Sentencing Commission’s new recommendations.  In their draft 
proposal, Reno and McCaffrey proposed “parity for crack powder cocaine at 100 grams” and the 
repealing of “the disparity for simple possession of crack.”218 This draft did not become the 
official policy of the Clinton Administration, Reno, or McCaffrey, but it reveals that the Clinton 
Administration knew—at least in 1997, there is no evidence at the moment revealing that the 
Administration had this knowledge in 1995—that the most sound crack policy was equalization 
of the crack and powder cocaine punishments. Reno and McCaffrey stated that “the sole notable 
distinction between [crack and cocaine], namely the systemic violence associated with multiple 
and anonymous drug sales of crack markets, [was] already taken into account by existing U.S. 
Sentencing Commission guidelines.”219 Put another way, Clinton’s Attorney General and 
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy maintained—behind closed doors— in 
1997 that the Sentencing Commission has already proposed the best crack policy in 1995.  
In their recommendation, McCaffrey and Reno restated many of the conclusions that the 
Sentencing Commission came to in 1995. Like the Commission’s report, the draft proposal noted 
the similarities between crack and cocaine— specifically the dangers associated with injecting 
cocaine. Reno and McCaffrey also noted the public nature of the crack market which exposes 
individuals more readily to law enforcement. The draft also substantiated the Commission’s 
findings about the crime and violence associated with the crack market, noting that the 
relationship between crack and violence was “put forward as one of the major justifications for a 
disparity in sentencing for crack offenses.” They noted that most crime and violence associated 
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with crack was systemic crime, not born from the drug itself.220 Moreover, they noted that 
“psychopharmacologically driven crime may be least important in explaining the association 
between crime and crack and powder cocaine.”221  
Interestingly, while the draft proposal recounted many of the same points as the 
Sentencing Commission, it did not address the concern that African Americans were 
disproportionally punished under federal law. In fact, the draft only references race explicitly 
once and the “inner city” once more. While it is difficult to argue from a void, it is important to 
note this draft was unconcerned with the racial disparity of crack cocaine sentences. The Clinton 
Administration was fully aware of the racial disparity between crack and cocaine. In numerous 
preceding and following documents, the Administration provided talking points, answers to 
media questions, and concerns about the disparity. Media attention to this bias was one of the 
major forces driving the Clinton Administration to act, but they did not list it as a reason to 
equalize crack and cocaine. The only notes about race in this proposal state that whites used both 
crack and powder cocaine in larger numbers than blacks and that “the greater use of cocaine 
continues to be outside inner cities.”222   
This draft problematizes the Clinton Administration’s entire handling of the crack and 
powder cocaine disparity, especially when one returns to the 1995 Sentencing Commission with 
this information in mind. Without action by Congress and/or the President, the Commission’s 
1995 recommendations would have become the law. The President signed legislation, however, 
stopping the recommendations from becoming law two days before they would have anyway.223 
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While there is no evidence to support the claim that anyone within the Clinton Administration 
believed that equalization was the best policy in 1995, the Sentencing Commission provided the 
Administration with all the information that led Reno and McCaffrey to their 1997 beliefs in 
equal punishments for the two drugs. The only change that came in those two years were the 
emergence of more studies supporting the Sentencing Commission’s claims and a rise of media 
outrage against the unjust 100/1 ratio. Though an argument that Clinton rejected the 
Commission’s recommendations for political expediency may be based more on conjecture than 
actual evidence, it is indisputable that the Clinton Administration was given unbiased and sound 
evidence justifying a base equalization of crack and cocaine. Equalization of crack and cocaine 
would have become law if the Administration did nothing. Instead Clinton opted for action and a 
minimum of two more years of an unjust sentencing scheme. 
This proposal also undermines much of the paternalistic nature of the Clinton 
Administration’s crack strategy. Harris, in her statement before the subcommittee on crime, 
declared that crack was “taking its toll on [the] country, and particularly on our most vulnerable 
communities.”224 The “most vulnerable communities” refers here to the young and poor. The 
1997 draft combats the notion that young people became victims to crack addiction in large 
numbers, stating that “popularity of both crack and cocaine powder [was] down, particularly 
among young users who disdain crack as a ‘ghetto drug’ or find its use unmanageable.”225 Along 
with Harris, other members of the Clinton Administration frequently cited crack use among 
young people as a justification for the sentencing disparity. The Sentencing Commission called 
this fear mongering into question in 1995 who found that at every age level, cocaine was used 
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more frequently than crack.226 It should also be noted that while crack use among young people 
was never as frequent as politicians claimed, young people were frequently involved in the crack 
market.227 However, this does not change the fact that the Clinton Administration perpetuated the 
fear of crack use among America’s youth to push forth their crack strategies.  
It is also necessary to examine the Congress that the Clinton Administration faced, which 
certainly shaped their policy decisions. Beginning in 1995, Republicans controlled both houses 
of Congress. These Republicans clung to the tough on crime narrative much tighter than the 
Clinton Administration. This certainly deterred the Clinton Administration from passing any 
legislation that seemed soft on crime in any way. This was especially true for crack cocaine. As 
crack had become racialized in the minds of many Americans, it was necessary for many 
members of the GOP to keep the penalties for crack cocaine unnecessarily tough. Because of the 
nature of this Congress, Reno and McCaffrey’s draft proposal would never have passed both 
houses. This does not negate the problems that the draft raised, as it still proves that individuals 
within the Clinton Administration—two leaders in criminal justice and drug policy—believed 
equalization to be the best strategy.  
Leading Republican Senators, Spencer Abraham, Orrin Hatch, and Trent Lott staunchly 
opposed any reduction in punishment for crack. These men proposed raising the penalties for 
powder cocaine to combat the disparity between crack and cocaine sentencing. They also denied 
any racial component to the 100/1 discrepancy. Despite “the appearance of unequal justice,” the 
belief in such a racial injustice was based on incorrect reasoning, the Senators contended in a 
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letter to the President.228 This denunciation of any racial bias in federal crack sentencing is made 
more ominous by the Senators’ declaration that “now is not the time to lower sentences for drug 
dealers.”229 Alone the statement may not seem dangerous or ominous in any way, but one must 
only think to Martin Luther King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail in which he chided those 
individuals telling him to wait and stated “wait has almost always meant never.”230 King also 
noted the unwillingness of those who benefit from oppression to give up those privileges.  
Many may admonish this choice stating that it is unfair to compare the battles of Dr. King 
with crack dealers and crack addicts. Yet, the drug itself has grown to be seen as a uniquely 
Black drug despite the fact that White Americans consumed it in much larger numbers. Those 
convicted of crack charges at the federal level were overwhelmingly African American, and they 
were sent to prison for an extensive amount of time. After their prison term, these individuals 
were subject to job, housing, welfare, loan, and educational discrimination; often this 
discrimination left them in poverty. They could not break out of poverty because they could not 
get a job or decent housing due to their felony status. These individuals did not face the same 
violent mobs that Dr. King faced, but they still faced widespread discrimination, entrapment in a 
cycle of poverty, and police brutality. As author Michelle Alexander argues, these individuals 
faced the same system of oppression that Dr. King fought; it simply modified itself to fit within 
the new legal standards. It continued to segregate African Americans into low quality 
neighborhoods and kept them poor and disenfranchised, but the lynch mobs were gone.231   
                                                           
228 Letter, Spencer Abraham, Orrin Hatch, and Trent Lott, January 29, 1998, Drugs: Crack Cocaine Sentencing [2], 
Leanne Shimabukuro, Domestic Policy Council.  1 
229 Ibid. 
230Martin Luther King Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” in Dissent in America: 400 Years That Shaped a Nation, 
Ralph Young, (New York: Pearson):2008. 
231 Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York: The New 
Press, 2010.    
  
91 
 
While a majority of Congress opposed a lowering of penalties for any form of cocaine, 
there was knowledge of the unjust nature of the sentencing structure and some public support for 
altering it.  The New York Times was one of the most vocal publications in their support for the 
changing of the sentencing structures. In November of 1995, the Times called the disparity 
“unjust” and chided Congress as being “demagogic.”232 They also noted that even if Congress 
did not understand the racial consequences of the disparity, it was now clearly aware and 
unmoved. In an earlier article over the prison uprising following Congress’s vote, the Times 
quoted Scott Wallace, head of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association after he 
lamented, “Part of what amazes a lot of us is that Congress and the President [rejected] the 
recommendation of a body that was set up precisely to remove politics and snap judgments from 
the sentencing process so there isn’t discrimination.”233  
Facing pressure from the right to keep drug penalties harsh, district court judges pushed 
the opposite pressure onto the Clinton Administration. Over the years, the law required these 
individuals to hand out crack sentences that were much too harsh for the crime at hand and 
argued that the disparity between crack and cocaine should be remedied by raising the amount of 
crack cocaine required to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence. These judges claimed that the 
current sentencing structure resulted in unjust sentences that did “not serve society’s interest” 
and only caused pain for the defendant and his or her family.234 In their argument, the judges 
noted the lack of difference between the average crack and powder cocaine defendant. Over their 
years of service, they found that these people were “generally impoverished individuals with 
limited education whose involvement with crack rather than powder cocaine [was] more a result 
                                                           
232 “Cocaine Sentencing, Still Unjust,” New York Times, Nov. 5 1995 
233 “Wave of Prison Uprisings Provokes Debate on Crack,” New York Times, Oct. 24, 1995. 
234 Letter from judges, 1-2. 
  
92 
 
of the demand in their neighborhood than a conscious choice to sell one type of drug rather than 
the other.”235 In the face of so much rhetoric demonizing crack users and dealers, these district 
court judges spoke out to humanize individuals involved with crack cocaine. Though these 
judges did not address the racial inequality of the 100/1 ratio, they did condemn the ratio as 
inherently unjust, regardless of its racial implications.   
It is clear that the Clinton Administration struggled with how to deal with the crack and 
powder cocaine disparity. They recognized a miscarriage of justice that needed to be remedied, 
but to fix the situation risked Clinton’s political standing. If he came out and seemed even the 
slightest bit soft on drugs, his opponent would use it against him, likely with great success. In 
this way, the war on drugs mirrored the decades long battle against communism—nobody could 
afford to sound lenient. The battle then became for the Administration a struggle between 
political needs and doing the right thing. While previously they may have ignored sound 
arguments for the equalization of crack and cocaine, it cannot be stated that anyone within the 
Administration believed parity to be the best solution until 1997. After the second Sentencing 
Commission report, the Clinton Administration attempted to gain support for a change the 
sentencing structures without success. This can be largely attributed to the Republican-controlled 
Congress that profited immensely from tough on crime rhetoric. In the last weeks of his time in 
office, Clinton extended clemency to Smith, after spending six years in prison. Smith went on to 
become an author, advocate, and activist, seeking to educate people on the nation’s punitive drug 
policies. 
Unfortunately, for many people caught in the wires of the war on drugs, there was little 
empathy extended to them. Political expediency, fear mongering, and anecdotal evidence, rather 
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than hard data, drove drug policy. This is especially true with crack cocaine. From its inception, 
fear drove politicians to enact harsh policies for crack cocaine offenses even sometimes in the 
face of logic and facts. The Sentencing Commission echoed this in their 1995 report, “despite the 
unprecedented level of public attention focused on crack cocaine, a substantial gap continues to 
exist between the anecdotal experiences that often prompt a call for action and empirical 
knowledge upon which to base sound policy… policy makers must draw conclusions 
cautiously.”236 This warning did little to drive policy makers to draft and pass well-informed and 
rational sentencing schemes for crack cocaine. The consequences of harsh drug penalties are 
human lives. Rather than receive the treatment they need, addicts are thrown into prison and 
likely into a cycle of drug addiction, poverty, and more prison time. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
NEVER IGNORANT GETTING GOALS ACCOMPLISHED 
 
While a discussion of policy decisions is necessary in the history of the war on drugs, it 
also important to find Black voices that are not represented in traditional archival 
material. Using lyrics from rap and hip hop artists allows for an understanding of the war 
on drugs and mass incarceration from the point of view of the oppressed. It also gives 
agency to a people too often cast simply as victims of white supremacy. Given the lack of 
Black voices found in presidential archives, this inclusion of lyrical matter is necessary to 
bring the Black narrative into this story. Too often, people discredit the work of rap or hip 
hop artists as romanticizing the gangster lifestyle or as playing the black card. While 
some artists do glorify their violent lifestyle and the concurrent drug and alcohol use, 
much of these lyrics are just reflections of the artist’s reality or an exercise in expressing 
their pride in their heritage. It is important to recognize rap and hip hop as artistic outlets 
of the African American community and as windows into their experiences. These artists 
created music that reflected their reality. Their home communities were filled with drugs 
and violence, and so their music was too. The explicit lyrical content shocked suburban 
America as young White children began listening to artists such as N.W.A, Ice Cube,
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Killer Mike, and Public Enemy. To some degree, the backlash these artists faced was a 
manifestation of White fear of black pride and power—that aforementioned historical racism 
once again rearing its ugly head.   
Within the rise of rap and hip hop into the mainstream, another important innovation 
must be noted. The men of what has been called the Hip Hop Generation represent deviations 
from the traditional racist life trajectory expected by white society. Just as Khalil Muhammad 
noted the mark of criminality in the progressive era, that mark remains with African American 
men today and is often wrongly justified by the disproportionate numbers of incarcerated African 
Americans.237 While scholars have begun to investigate the origins of mass incarceration, little 
work has been done to investigate the experiences of African Americans in the wake of harsh 
drug legislation and mass incarceration in communities ripped apart by the drug war. Many 
artists of the Hip Hop Generation, including Ice Cube, Killer Mike, Tupac, Dr. Dre, and Public 
Enemy, chose career paths within the law after seeing the discrepant number of people of color 
in the criminal justice system. They turned away from the stereotypical drug slinging gang 
lifestyle in favor of musical outlets and used their spotlight to shed light on the issues facing their 
home communities, with particular emphasis on violence, prison, and police misconduct. This 
qualification must be made tentatively, though, as a number of these individuals remained 
enmeshed in lifestyles filled with drug use and violence, most notably Tupac and Dr. Dre. Ice 
Cube and Killer Mike, by contrast, not only disregarded this lifestyle in favor of music but 
actively condemned it. Indeed, in his song “Hood Mentality,” Ice Cube states, 
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Fuck school nigga, I'ma be a dope dealer 
I'ma be a killa, yep a urban guerrilla 
I'ma stack scrilla, yeah buy me a villa 
Sell a 5-0 to my auntie Priscilla 
I don't give a fuck that she look like "Thriller" 
Hit that shit one more time and fuck around and kill her 
Cause I got the heart of a Pittsburgh Steeler 
Black nigga draped in gold, with a nine milla 
Love money, love jail, love that penitentiary mail 
Love the way these niggaz smell, keep comin' back, can't you tell? 
Love to see my mama cry, love to see my babies struggle 
Love to see my woman juggle nuts 'cause she got to hustle 
I don't give a fuck how my life go…. 
Gunnin' niggaz down 'cause they don't got the right clothes 
Hit the wrong person 'cause we shoot just like hoes 
First I was blood thirsty, Mr.-Mr. Controversy 
Now I wanna beg for mercy, should have took my ass to Berkeley  
If you don’t wanna shake that hood mentality 
How the fuck we supposed to change our reality?238 
 
“Hood Mentality” is a scathing denouncement of the gangster mentality that encourages young 
Black men to make their living outside the law and encourages these men to pursue education 
and work within the law to change their lives. He is promoting a life path that many drug 
warriors also supported, emphasizing personal responsibility. Ice Cube’s choice to separate 
himself from traditional stereotypes of urban life makes him an important role model for young 
Black men in the inner cities and an important social figure with his rebuking of the hood 
mentality.  
In several different songs, Tupac also condemned the gangster culture that he was a 
product of. This was perhaps most clear in his song ‘Changes.’ In the song, Tupac interacts with 
a friend, in which he chides him for his involvement in the drug trade, 
You gotta operate the easy way. 
“I made a G today” But you made it in a sleazy way. 
Sellin’ crack to the kid. “I gotta get paid,” 
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Well hey, that’s the way it is. 
Tupac went on to describe his own criminal activities, “I ain’t never did a crime I ain’t have to 
do.”239 His lyrics worked on a variety of levels to combat traditional stereotypes, like the one 
implicit in Harris’s comments. First, he condemned the gangster lifestyle as the “easy way” and 
challenged his peers to forgo that lifestyle as it usually led to serious prison time. He also 
combated the notion that an individual’s involvement in crime represented a character flaw and 
instead asserted that it was often born out of desperation. Tupac stands as a human challenge to 
Harris’s perceptions; although Tupac did come from the inner city and engaged in the gangster 
lifestyle, he turned away from that way of life and sought a career within the law.  
In addition to deriding the criminal lifestyle, both these artists, along with others, offered 
a window into the turbulent nature of the inner city neighborhoods that they grew up in. 
Highlighting the violence in his home community, Tupac wrote, “Cause they never talk peace in 
tha black community/All we know is violence, do tha job in silence/Walk tha city streets like a 
rat pack of tyrants/Too many brothers daily heading for tha big penn/Niggas commin' out worse 
off than when they went in.”240 In just a few lines, Tupac was able to address a multitude of 
issues including violence, prison, and the negative effects of incarceration in the inner city. Ice 
Cube also highlights these issues in “The Nigga Trap,” 
Some people may say well, you overdramatized it 
No we're not - it's not a drama workshop, it is a reality 
Things like that do take place in prisons 
The murders, the suicides, as well as the rapes…. 
The ghetto is a nigga trap, take the cheese 
Soon as you do it here come the police 
Invented and designed fo' us to fail 
Where you gon' end up, dead or in jail…. 
 You only got two places 
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State of California, got two faces 
Motherfuckin devils, get straight racist 
When they get you in them lonely dark places 
Concrete slave ships, never move 
Where niggaz like us get used like a mule 
Don't let 'em catch you, arrest you 
Strip and undress you, throw you in a cesspool 
You wanna know the crime of the century 
A ghetto elementary, a mental penitentiary 
Black man, you never been friend of me 
Boy you kin to me, why we enemies? 
The ghe-tto is a trap241 
Ice Cube’s mention of the poor schools—calling them the crime of the century—in these 
neighborhoods is an important insight. Underfunded inner city schools were a direct legacy of 
Jim Crow and White flight to the suburbs and was an inherent disadvantage to inner city students 
when compared to the schooling their suburban counterparts received. For many, education is the 
key to escaping poverty and without it, there is little room for upward economic mobility. Tupac 
also explored the economic dynamics of the ghetto in “Hellrazor” writing, “I’m startin’ to think 
all the rich in the world is safe/ While the po’ babies restin’ in the early graves.”242 Interwoven 
into both men’s reflections on their communities was prison, but in different manners. Tupac 
acknowledged the prevalence with which his community saw Black men serving time, and Ice 
Cube describes the horrors one experienced while in prison. He is imploring people to listen to 
him and former convicts when they speak about their experiences. His exposure of the traumas 
experienced in prison reminds one of Smith’s concern, “Is this what the federal government calls 
correctional?”243  
The prevalence of violence in rap and hip hop music is a reflection of their reality, not a 
glorification. It must be understood as a traumatizing force that deregulates the ways in which 
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one processes emotions and in turn relates to the world. These emotional disturbances increased 
the likelihood an individual will turn to drug use as a coping mechanism, which then raises the 
chances one will be brought into the criminal justice system. Moreover, members of these 
communities often feel they have no support from law enforcement, as they found themselves 
routinely victimized by police. This is just one example of how systemic racism was inherent in 
inner cities in the 1980s and 1990s. In “Tales From the Darkside,” Ice Cube reflects on the 
relationship between violence and the police,  
Peace - don't make me laugh! 
All I hear is motherfuckers rappin sucotash 
Livin large, tellin me to get out the gang 
I'm a nigga, gotta live by the trigger 
How the fuck do you figure? 
that I can say peace and the gunshots will cease?! 
Every cop killer goes ignored 
They just send another nigga to the morgue 
A point scored- they could give a fuck about us 
They rather catch us with guns and white powder 
If I was old, they'd probably be a friend of me 
Since I'm young, they consider me the enemy 
They kill ten of me to get the job correct 
To serve, protect, and break a niggas neck…. 
Its a shame, that niggas die young 
But to the light side it don't matter none 
It'll be a drive by homicide 
But to me its just another tale from the darkside... 244 
 
Also enraged by police misconduct in “Trapped,” Tupac contented, “They got me trapped/ Can 
barely walk tha city streets/ Without a cop harrassing me, searching me/ Then asking my 
identity/ Hands up, throw me up against tha wall/ Didn't do a thing at all/ I'm tellen you one day 
these suckers gotta fall/ Cuffed up throw me on tha concrete/ Coppers try to kill me.”245 
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Understanding poor urban distrust of the police is pivotal for a holistic understanding of the war 
on drugs and the mass incarceration crisis. For many in these urban centers, the police were 
oppressors that frequently locked friends and family members away for non-violent crimes. This 
was perhaps the greatest disconnect between inner city Black Americans and middle class White 
Americans: trust of the police. White middle class Americans understood the police as a 
protective force, and for many White Americans, accusations of police misconduct sounded like 
excuses for deviant behavior rather than legitimate grievances. For inner city minorities, the 
police were victimizers; the rap group Public Enemy spoke of police misconduct, “Police 
supposed to keep the peace/ But I can’t truss’ em/ So I keep my piece/ Loaded and cocked.” 246 
These artists lodged claims against police, the criminal justice system, and the war on drugs that 
would not be taken seriously by middle class White Americans until 2014. They were using their 
celebrity to attempt to bring issues facing the inner city into the mainstream conversation.   
There was a multitude of rap and hip hop artists during the 1980s and 1990s that spoke 
out against police misconduct—only a small percentage is represented here—which suggests that 
young Black men were repeatedly faced racial discrimination within the criminal justice system.  
Accusations of racist behavior frequented many of Ice Cube’s songs. In “AmeriKKKa’s Most 
Wanted,” he takes aim at the integrity of law enforcement, “I got hassled and gaffled in the back  
seat/I think back when I was robbin my own kind/The police didn't pay it no mind/But when I 
start robbin the white folks/Now I'm in the pen wit the soap-on-a-rope/I said it before and I'll still 
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taught it/ Every motherfucker with a colour is most wanted.”247 Ice Cube levies more accusations 
in “Color Blind,” but this time against multiple individuals within the criminal justice system, 
I'm fresh outta county on bail 
And no sooner do I get out, seems like I'm right back in jail 
For some gang related activity 
Cuz everyday, different fools try to get with me 
For no more than a color, or territory 
Can't rehabilitate 'em, that's the sheriff's story 
So what's left, the judge goes deaf 
When you try to tell your side 
And you ain't blue eyed 
Boy you better duck cuz the book is comin' 
And just hand your car keys over to your woman 
Because it aint no sunshine where you headed 
And the shit'll drive you crazy if you let it 
But now, I got time to think 
Because they hit me with everything but the kitchen sink248 
 
In these two selections, Ice Cube levies two substantial and important accusations against the 
criminal justice system. The first being the police’s lack of attention and resources dedicated to 
the murder of Black Americans, and the second being the criminal justice system’s lack of 
interest in the background of Black defendants. These accusation serve as further proof of the 
biased nature of the criminal justice system. African Americans frequently faced poor education, 
violence, drugs, targeted law enforcement, and contempt in the court room, and many of these 
problems were a part of their home communities—meaning they faced these issues on a daily or 
weekly basis. These insights give voice to a community whose voice is difficult to find in 
traditional archives but provide a fully rounded understanding of the war on drugs and mass 
incarceration, which is why it is necessary to look to these lyrics. An understanding of these 
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institutions based on the papers of elected officials misses the human lives most effected by 
harsh drug policies, and without them it is difficult to understand the failure of the drug war.    
Backlash against discriminatory police practices can be found in the lyrical matter of 
many rap and hip hop artists. The most obvious being N.W.A’s infamous song ‘Fuck the Police’ 
in which Ice Cube chides the Los Angeles Police Department saying,  
Fuck the police coming straight from the underground 
A young nigga got it bad cause I'm brown 
And not the other color so police think 
They have the authority to kill a minority 
Fuck that shit, cause I ain't the one  
For a punk motherfucker with a badge and a gun 
To be beating on, and thrown in jail 
We can go toe to toe in the middle of a cell 
Fucking with me cause I'm a teenager 
With a little bit of gold and a pager 
Searching my car, looking for the product 
Thinking every nigga is selling narcotics 
You'd rather see, me in the pen 
Than me and Lorenzo rolling in a Benz-o249 
While many disregard rap music because of the frequent inclusion of sexuality, drugs, and 
violence, Bennett’s testimony—in which he states that officers identified drug dealers by their 
pagers—validates the content of one of the most controversial groups of the 1980s. Though 
Bennett said nothing of the race of the individuals, he still noted that their pagers and expensive 
clothing— which Ice Cube highlights as the problem—were used to identify the dealers. This 
admission by Bennett exposes the disregard of gangster—or frequently also called reality rap—
as racist projections onto these artists. The refusal of the American public to take these 
unabashedly black men at their word about their experiences in Compton reflects the United 
States’ long history of racism. Rather than accept these claims as the norm and attempt some 
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form of reform, the FBI and the Detroit police department attempted to censor the content of the 
song. Law enforcement officials were more concerned with how the song affected their own 
lives rather than the hardships that communities like Compton faced every day.   
 Much of the backlash that N.W.A faced for this controversial song grew out of the song’s 
frankness concerning violence against the police. Many chided the song for its glorification of 
not just violence but the thug or gangster lifestyle that centered on violence. However, these 
individuals did not take into consideration the historic plight of the African American.250 Indeed, 
since the first African slaves were brought into this country, the police have operated in 
opposition to their existence, which has been characterized most notably by violence. In this 
context, the violent response of African Americans is better understood and even more so when 
one remembers Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter From a Birmingham Jail.” In it King states,   
Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The urge for freedom will 
eventually come. This is what happened to the American Negro. Something has 
reminded him of his birthright of freedom; something without has reminded him 
that he can gain it…. The Negro has many pent up resentments and latent 
frustrations. He has to get them out. So let him march sometime; let him have his 
prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; understand why he must have sit-ins and 
freedom rides. If his repressed emotions do not come out in these nonviolent 
ways, they will come out in ominous expressions of violence. This is not a threat; 
it is a fact of history. 251  
While promoting violence against the police is not praiseworthy or desirable in a civilized 
society, taken in the context of the plight of African Americans this call to violence seems to be a 
manifestation of King’s premonition. Certainly, the rise of black power and the Black Panther 
Party in the 1970s was one manifestation of this turn to violence, and this song is an addition to 
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that resistance. Despite the gains that were made during the Civil Rights era, African Americans 
continued to suffer from police brutality and racial profiling in the 1980s and 1990s. This song 
and the violence within its lyrical matter are the “ominous expressions of violence” that Dr. King 
warned about if the African American did not receive the respect from white society that they 
fought, bleed, and died for.252 While white civilian violence against African Americans no longer 
went unpunished, the police continued to perpetrate unequal violence and racial profiling against 
African Americans. Rather than the promotion of violence for the sake of being controversial, 
‘Fuck the Police’ must be understood as a backlash against the centuries of violence and 
oppression forced onto African Americans. This understanding reshapes the song from an 
unnecessary ballad of anger to a lyrical form of protest.  
 The adapted understanding of ‘Fuck the Police’ is important in understanding Black 
resistance in the post civil rights era. Too often, Black grievances were and are pushed aside as 
unappreciative complaints from “thugs” that need to change the way they live after the successes 
of the Civil Rights movements. This was largely in response to the culture of resistance 
discussed in a previous chapter and the newfound pride in Black culture.253 These individuals 
were no longer presenting themselves in a manner acceptable to the mainstream culture, like Dr. 
King. These individuals fully embraced their urban identities and refused to alter them to cater to 
White society. Groups like N.W.A and Public Enemy must be understood as manifestations of 
pride in the urban Black identity. They were not thugs promoting a gangster lifestyle but artists 
reflecting their neighborhoods and interactions with the police and White America. These artists 
were bold and daring in their resistance and deserve to be recognized for their part in the 
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centuries long fight for Black liberation in this nation that has operated against them since before 
it was an independent country.254 
Ice Cube repeated the notion that rap and Black Americans by extension were to blame 
for their own and others’ problems by writing,  
I do gangsta Rap 
They want to blame the world problems on Gangsta Rap 
It's our fault, 
Cause motherfuckers are dying in Iraq 
It's our fault, 
Cause motherfuckers is starving in Africa 
It's Gangsta Raps fault, 
That people are poor 
Can't get enough to fucking eat or live their life 
(That's bullshit) 
That's rap musics fault. 
It's rap musics fault, 
We got all these god damn laws, and restrictions and shit we can't do 
(That's bullshit) 
They blame it all on us 
I'm blamin' them motherfuckers for Gangsta Rap 
Because if they didn't create these kind of conditions 
I wouldn't have shit to rap about 
You know what I mean! [sic] 255 
Though he was not writing in reference to any specific individual or institution, he made the 
same argument made in this study: drug use, music, or pride in black culture are coping 
mechanisms. The ambiguous “they” that represent the powers that be believe that these coping 
mechanisms are the problem when in reality they are attempted solutions. J.R. Reynolds, writing 
for Billboard, maintained that “obscenities uttered by bad-boy rap acts led to a national backlash 
among concerned parents and politicians, who submitted censorship legislation. Feeling the 
pressure, many mainstream music retailers refused to carry releases with lyrics-warning 
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stickers.”256 Another reporter described rap music as being filled with “violent and misogynic 
imagery [that] has gone far beyond being rebellious and informing the world about inner-city 
life,” and argued that rap music promoted “the idea that it [was] alright to kill, rape, and abuse 
drugs.”257 While many will chide the choice to compare rap music and drug abuse as coping 
mechanisms, it is what they are. They are more than just ways to liven up a party and were both 
deeply misunderstood by mainstream America and the government.258    
It is important to examine these lyrics because they are a response to the mainstream 
criticism of rap music. Certainly some of the accusations that Ice Cube satirically levies against 
himself were hyperbolic. Nobody was accusing rap of causing starvation in Africa. What’s more 
is that many of these accusations were not necessarily directly aimed at just rap music, but in a 
larger sense, the lifestyle that many believed rap music to encourage: drug use, violence, sexual 
deviancy, and gang membership. Ice Cube is taking these accusations and redirecting them, 
stating that rap music and the lifestyle associated with it were responses to the condition of his 
neighborhood, which he had no part in creating. He was just born into it, and whoever was to 
blame about the dilapidated condition of Compton was also to blame for the music and lifestyles 
that came out of deteriorating neighborhoods like Compton. 
 An examination of rap lyrics of the 1980s and 1990s as a window into the experiences of 
inner city Black youth reveal a troubled reality. These individuals faced police harassment, gang 
violence, drug use, poor education, loss of jobs, and an unstable community environment. These 
realities increased the likelihood that residents of these neighborhoods would be arrested and/or 
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incarcerated in their lifetime. For artists to leave those neighborhoods and achieve success in the 
music business and to then condemn the dangerous lifestyles prevalent in these communities was 
an important development as it gave young Black kids role models that came out of similar 
situations and achieved success within the law. Using these lyrics as historical sources is an 
important exercise in trust. It is an extension of trust to these subjects that their stories are valid 
and truthful when too often they are disregarded as ignorant thugs.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
CRACK IS WHACK.  
 
In May 1996, Emerge magazine—which prided itself on being a news magazine for 
Black America—ran a cover story on Kemba Smith titled, “Kemba’s Nightmare: A 
Model Child Becomes Prisoner #26370-083.” Smith’s story quickly gained national 
attention, and Smith herself became a symbol for unjust sentencing structures. After the 
article ran, Smith’s parents began receiving invitations to speak about her incarceration 
and petition for support for Smith’s petition for clemency across the country. By August 
of that same year, the Legal Defense Fund (LDF) expressed interest in taking on Smith’s 
case pro bono. Members of Congress also offered their help and support. Congressman 
Bobby Scott (D-VA) and Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) both contacted Smith 
and worked to bring justice to her case. The Congressional Black Caucus, Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement 
Executives, National Association of Black Journalists, National Association of Black 
Social Workers, and the National Association of Black Psychologists all offered Smith
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their support in her quest for early release. Despite all these efforts, as the sun was setting 
on the millennium, Smith remained behind bars.259    
Smith became the poster child for the unjust nature of mandatory minimums 
because her story is a clear example of the problems they cause. Smith’s only crime was 
loving a drug dealer; she did not use herself nor did she act as a mule for her boyfriend 
Peter Hall. Yet, as rap star Ice Cube put it, “they hit [her] with everything but the kitchen 
sink.”260 Like so many others whose stories will never be told, Smith’s undoing was her 
proximity to crack cocaine. From its emergence onto the drug scene in the mid-1980s, 
crack has been characterized as a menace to society with a destructive power like nothing 
before it. Crack is a very addictive substance that deteriorates the human body, and there 
is no denying that. But politicians dismissed those who fell victim to it as people beyond 
help, ones who deserved no future in a United States trying to recover from the social and 
political traumas of recent decades. 
Indeed, federal politicians punished crack use so harshly, while they punished 
cocaine, which has the same chemical makeup, 100 times lighter. The reason they did 
this is more complicated than their evolving rhetoric suggests. There was no buildup of 
politicians working years in advance to finally get a piece of racist drug legislation onto 
the books. In fact, there was virtually no conversation about crack cocaine until the death 
of Len Bias in 1985, just a year before the establishment of the 100/1 sentencing 
discrepancy. It seems that the implementation of the 100/1 crack cocaine disparity was 
just an extension of the larger war on drugs and tough on crime mentality.  With the 
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unprecedented media attention given to crack in 1986, it became an easy avenue to win 
political points for all politicians, who punished the drug to a degree that satisfied the 
misguided public. Moreover, politicians’ decision to punish drug users so severely was 
made based on anecdotal evidence rather than empirical data. Stories published in the 
media drove the compulsion of harsh punishments rather than studies from scientists or 
sociologists. This lack of attention to detail affirms the notion that politicians sought to 
use the war on drugs as a political tool rather than a solution to the nation’s drug abuse 
problem. Though there is not evidence to suggest that these lawmakers sought to 
explicitly design a set of laws to oppress communities of color, the negative 
consequences of their actions cannot be ignored. These individuals must be held 
accountable for their swift decisions.  
Furthermore, this examination of the establishment of the 100/1 crack cocaine 
disparity reveals who is culpable for the discrepant impact of the war on drugs. While 
President and Nancy Reagan spearheaded a rejuvenated drug war in the early 1980s, they 
cannot be held solely responsible. Certainly, they worked to generate a socio-political 
climate that would be receptive to harsh drug penalties through their extensive media 
campaign, which was massively successful with citizens and lawmakers alike. Yet, 
President Reagan was not the most punitive voice in the nation during his presidency, nor 
can he be held solely responsible for the 100/1 sentencing disparity or the mass 
incarceration crisis. Several of his proposed punishments were weaker than those that 
later became law. Congress must share in the liability for these sentencing structures—
not just Republicans but also Democrats. The drug war was a bipartisan effort, running 
through the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, despite famed author Toni Morrison’s assertion 
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that Clinton was in everything but the color of his skin the first black president, given the 
opportunity to change one of the most racially biased drug laws in the nation, he chose to 
keep it in place because the political consequences of equalization between crack and 
cocaine were far too great, highlighting the massive shadow that Reagan cast on 
American politics.   
While lawmakers must be held accountable for creating these sentencing 
structures, law enforcement practices ensured that minorities would receive the largest 
negative impact of the drug war. The targeting of poor neighborhoods, frequent traffic 
stops for minor driving offenses resulting in searches, racial profiling, and a lack of 
empathy from prosecutors and judges have played the most significant role in sending so 
many people of color to prison. Despite the efforts of rap and hip hop artists to expose 
these issues to the public, they were often disregarded as White Americans viewed them 
as thugs making excuses for their bad behavior. Regardless, these musicians understood a 
fundamental truth about the criminal justice system long before middle class White 
Americans began to pay attention. They understood that biased police practices were 
sending too many people of color to prison. Over twenty years after these artists tried to 
expose law enforcement, many American people are finally listening to their criticisms 
and offering their support. The growing body of scholarship on the war on drugs and 
mass incarceration crisis are a testament to the growing awareness of and concern with 
the catastrophic effects of the drug war. Central to the growing historiography is the 
question of culpability for the modern mass incarceration crisis, and that fact underscores 
the importance of a micro study on powder and crack cocaine structures. In looking at 
these two drugs and their mandatory minimums, one can begin to trace the complicated 
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chain of cause and effect, political decision making, and police action that created the 
mass incarceration crisis. In identifying these coopting institutions and individuals, no 
one group, political party, or individual can be held responsible for today’s crowded 
prisons.  
The fundamental flaw in the war on drugs was that it failed to address the 
underlying issues of drug abuse. Instead of seeking to alleviate the pain that drove 
individuals to drugs, the drug war funneled individuals into prisons. This was a futile 
effort in regards to ending drug use. As one former convict recalled, 
Now the prison for Black women is what I call just a warehouse for 
people. They don’t have programs to help you come back in society, to 
help you with your problems as to why you wound up there. It’s just to get 
the money every time you come through the door. It’s a lucrative business. 
So here you are going right back out there to do the same thing with fifty 
dollars. What is fifty dollars, with no skills and no training and no 
education, going to do for someone? Getting out of jail with fifty dollars 
would make me want to go use some drugs and forget what’s going to 
happen two days down the line when I wake up with no money and no job. 
You would see women go out and come right back. There are three basic 
life-sustaining things that you have to have in life: food, clothing, and 
shelter. They don’t come free, and you can’t get them for fifty dollars. 
They know when they let you out that you’ll be back, unless you get 
fortunate enough to have a program like this to help you. And you have to 
want it. People fail to realize that all the people out here on the street that 
they see walking down the street using crack cocaine and stealing don’t do 
that because they want to do it. They have no other way.261 
The stories of individuals caught in the snares of the drug war ground the narrative in the 
struggles of real people experiencing the effects of the drug war on the street, in real time. 
It’s easy to get caught in the politics of the subject and miss the point of it all. The stories 
of incarcerated individuals and lyrics of rap artists that grew up in communities ridden 
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with drug use and incarceration highlights the human casualties of the drug war. They 
also combat racist views of individuals within these communities that misunderstand 
these people as miscreants, rather than victims of a larger system that works against them. 
It reveals that these individuals resented drug use as well as the white power structure 
that perpetuated and enabled the harsh conditions of their communities.   
 While the drug war was based on fundamental misunderstandings about drug 
abuse, no drug was more misunderstood than crack cocaine. Though it was indeed cheap 
and whack, as the late popular Black pop star Whitney Houston suggested, policymakers 
and the American public failed to grasp why it was “whack.” They understood it as a 
lightning rod for crime, violence, prostitution, and destruction. While crack is highly 
addictive and retains a great capacity for destruction, the other problems that mainstream 
society attributed to crack were not necessarily crack’s responsibility. The rise of gangs, 
crime, and violence in the inner cities was not because everybody was smoking crack but 
because they were destitute. The manufacturing jobs were gone, and thousands were left 
jobless. Add in systemic racism and poor education, it seems that the mythical rise of 
crack was born out of White American’s neglect and indifference towards the plight of 
urban minorities. This is important to note because it changes the conversation around the 
war on drugs. It frees us from a focus on punishment and accountability and allows us to 
instead consider the ways in which communities can come together to heal. It challenges 
the archetype of an urban youth as a hoodlum and a degenerate and instead understands 
these individuals as byproducts of a country that historically operated against them. It has 
left them poor and poorly educated yet maintains that their failures were byproducts of 
their own actions. This altered view of the inner city and drug abuse casts these 
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individuals as victims rather than as degenerates. Perhaps this kind of understanding of 
addiction is the only approach with the potential to eradicate drug abuse. 
On December 22, 2000, with only eight days left in the Clinton presidency, 
Kemba Smith anxiously waited for an update on her clemency plea. That day Smith’s 
lead counsel came to visit her. After chatting for over an hour, Smith asked him to go see 
if there were any updates on her case and then went to the yard to socialize with her 
fellow inmates, who offered her their congratulations. Recalling the confusing moment, 
Smith writes,  
Once I set foot out on the yard, other inmates came up to congratulate me.  
“What for?” I asked one of them.  
“You’re out of here!” She responded.  
I didn’t believe it. I had just walked past my case manager, who didn’t say 
a word to me. How could I be leaving if my case manager passed me 
without saying a word about it? Then I saw my close friend, Michelle, 
who was serving a life sentence…. Then she told me she saw it on CNN. 
She told me she had just seen an announcement on CNN that I was 
granted executive clemency.262  
 
Smith was released that day and finally able to be the mother she longed to be. She went 
on to be an author and public speaker, sharing her story in the hopes of making a 
difference in the lives of women everywhere. Smith’s story is one of triumph, but it is 
also a rarity. Too many mothers and fathers remain behind bars, unable to watch their 
children grow up, because of non-violent drug charges. The costs of the drug war cannot 
be measured by dollar amounts but in human lives. Each drug criminal has a story of 
what got them into prison, and listening to these stories is the key to Reagan’s dream of a 
drug free America. Listening to these individuals and understanding why they turned to 
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drugs will provide the answers on how best to tackle drug abuse, because it is clear that 
the current plan is not working.
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